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Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 29 of its resolution 1355 (2001) of 14 June 2001, decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 15 June 2002 and to review progress at least every four months. The present report is submitted in accordance with that decision and describes developments since my report (S/2001/572) of 8 June 2001.

II. Political developments

2. The overall situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to develop in a largely positive direction. The ceasefire has held and the disengagement of forces and their redeployment to new defensive positions is effectively complete. Some foreign forces have been withdrawn from the territory. The preparatory meeting of the inter-Congolese dialogue, which is an essential element of the peace process, was held successfully. At the same time, outbreaks of fighting have continued, if not intensified, in the east of the country.

My visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

3. Prior to my visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I met President Kabila and President Kagame in Lusaka, on the margins of the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. The two Presidents pledged to take initiatives that would promote peace. They met again in Malawi on 26 September and also held separate meetings with other leaders in the region.

4. From 1 to 5 September 2001, I visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. During my visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I met in Kinshasa with the President, Joseph Kabila, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Léonard She Okitundu; the neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire; and representatives of civil society, members of the diplomatic corps and the heads of United Nations agencies and MONUC staff.

5. During my meeting with President Kabila, on 2 September, I welcomed the Government's continuing adherence to the ceasefire on the confrontation line, but expressed grave disquiet over the continuing fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government should use all its influence to bring the fighting in the east to an end and open a dialogue with the Government of Rwanda. In addition, it should cooperate with MONUC in the preparations for the demobilization of the soldiers of Rwandan origin located at Kamina. In this regard, President Kabila announced that some 3,000 soldiers at that location would be demobilized shortly and invited MONUC to be present on that occasion.

6. I briefed the President on the Mission's plans for further deployment in the east of the country and requested the cooperation of his Government. During this visit, I conveyed the United Nations views on how to approach the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of the armed groups. I also indicated that

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the positive response of the international community rested in part on continuing improvements in the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Finally, I expressed serious concern about the humanitarian situation and requested the Government to help improve access to populations in need.

7. On 3 September, I met with representatives of civil society and with the leadership of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) in Kisangani. At my meeting with the RCD leadership, I insisted on the earliest possible demilitarization of the town in accordance with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000). I also stressed that the further deployment of MONUC would require the full cooperation of RCD and would also entail, in due course, the rehabilitation of the rail link between Kisangani and Ubundu, so as to reopen the rail/river connection between Kindu and Kisangani (the K-2 link). The RCD leaders present indicated their agreement in principle with this approach.

8. On 4 September, I met with the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, in Kigali and conveyed to him my views on how to move the peace process forward. In particular, Rwanda should use its influence to halt the fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. It should also commence a process of reducing its military presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in accordance with Security Council resolutions, and maintain a dialogue with that country, that would include confidence-building measures. I also conveyed to President Kagame my views on how to approach the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of the armed groups. President Kagame expressed his Government's willingness to take back the Rwandan former combatants now in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The President reiterated, however, that those suspected of crimes against humanity would be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Inter-Congolese dialogue

9. The preparatory meeting for the inter-Congolese dialogue was held at Gaborone from 20 to 24 August, in a spirit of conciliation and compromise. Some 70 delegates participated, representing the Government, the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC), RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, the political opposition in Government-controlled areas and civil society. The meeting adopted a draft agenda for the national dialogue, its draft rules of procedure, and decided that the dialogue would start on 15 October in Addis Ababa.

10. The Gaborone meeting also resulted in a Declaration of Commitment in which the parties committed themselves to the liberalization of political activity; protection of fundamental human rights; release of political prisoners and prisoners of war; freedom of movement of people and goods throughout the country; re-establishment of communication links in the country and the rehabilitation of the infrastructure; restitution of seized property; protection of the population from arbitrary arrest; protection of natural resources from illegal exploitation; and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. To monitor the implementation of the Declaration of Commitment, the parties also decided to put in place a follow-up committee, which held its first meeting at the end of October in Nairobi.

11. The preparatory meeting was an important exercise in confidence-building, during which the parties were able to develop unofficial channels of communication. In this connection, President Kabila held talks with the rebel leaders, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Chairman of MLC, and Adolphe Onusumba, President of RCD.

12. As requested by the facilitator, the United Nations will be providing conference-servicing assistance in the organization of the dialogue. In this connection, a senior United Nations conference coordinator has been assigned to the Office of the facilitator, in addition to staff made available through the Mission's budget.

13. The facilitator has confirmed that the inter-Congolese dialogue will begin on 15 October. After consultation with the Congolese parties, it was initially envisaged that the dialogue would gather more than 300 participants. However, because funds pledged by donors had not yet been made available, he decided, following consultations with the Congolese parties, to revert to the Gaborone formula by calling for a reduced meeting of some 70 participants. Such a meeting would address several outstanding political and procedural issues. The facilitator intends to convene the plenary meeting of the dialogue once sufficient funds are available.

14. The facilitator has expressed his deep concern to me that women may be inadequately represented in the inter-Congolese dialogue. He has appealed to the Congolese parties and signatories to the Lusaka Agreement to increase their quota of female representation.

Meeting of the Political Committee

15. A meeting of the Political Committee scheduled for 4 July was not held. A meeting was subsequently held on 14 and 15 September in Kigali under the chairmanship of the Rwandan Minister in the Office of the President, Patrick Mazimhaka. The Political Committee endorsed the decision of the Joint Military Commission to co-locate to Kinshasa with MONUC; that decision has yet to be implemented. It also decided that the next Chairman of the Political Committee would be Angola, with Uganda as Vice-Chairman.

16. However, the Political Committee did not address the status of the rebel faction (RCD-K) that has broken away from RCD, a number of alleged ceasefire violations in Katanga Province and the increasing level of military activity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Political Committee also criticized what it called the "hesitancy" of the United Nations in deploying forces to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A proposal by MLC to establish a force comprising units from all three Congolese parties, under MONUC leadership, to ensure border security, was rejected by the Government.

17. During the session of the Political Committee, the Government of Rwanda invited representatives of all participating delegations to visit Nkumba camp, in Ruhengeri Province, where some 1,800 former anti-Government combatants are undergoing re-education and rehabilitation. The camp authorities presented a former ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)/ Interahamwe commander, who had been captured by government forces in July 2001. The commander gave an account of the support allegedly provided to armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to him, government aircraft dropped military material, communications equipment and large sums of Congolese currency. The officer also claimed that the attacks on Rwanda of May 2001 had been approved by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the objective of destabilizing Rwanda and averting further attacks by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe.

Other developments

18. On 13 September, the Government announced its intention to pay retroactively three years' salary to magistrates and State workers in rebel-controlled territory. While MLC welcomed the Government offer and promised to cooperate, RCD claimed that the action was premature and should be discussed during the inter-Congolese dialogue. The rejection of the Government initiative by RCD led to unrest and demonstrations in Bukavu, leaving one person dead, and to the threat of labour strikes in Goma and Kisangani.

19. During August, the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie expelled 17 of its 51 founding members, some of whom subsequently aligned themselves with the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo. Meanwhile, leadership rivalries within the union of RCD-ML (Mouvement de libération) and MLC, known as the Front de libération du Congo (FLC), led RCD-ML to withdraw its support from FLC. RCD announced on 18 September that it had appointed a 70-member provincial assembly, whose seat is located in North Kivu, in keeping with its previously announced plans to establish a federal system of government in the areas of the country under its control. RCD also organized an "inter-Kivu dialogue" in Bukavu with participants from both North and South Kivu, from 25 to 29 September. The meeting was boycotted by many church and civil society groups.

III. Military and security developments

20. The ceasefire along the confrontation line has held since January 2001, and the armed forces of the parties have separated and redeployed, apart from a few minor exceptions, to new defensive positions.

21. Despite the calm along the front line, however, and the absence of ceasefire violations within the disengagement zone throughout the period under review, the situation in the east remains highly volatile. The number of alleged ceasefire violations there has risen significantly; they are attributed mainly to armed groups. There are almost daily reports of fighting in the Kivus and on and along Lake Tanganyika and its western environs, much of the armed activity being

focused on the strategic town of Fizi. The fighting is largely between armed groups, including Burundian rebels, and RCD/RPA. In order to enhance its monitoring capabilities, MONUC has increased its presence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

22. At the Political Committee meeting held on 14 and 15 September, RCD accused the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of supporting armed groups and produced a list of generals of the Forces armées congolaises allegedly involved in the area. The Government vehemently denied this allegation. RCD also alleged that an aircraft landed at a location 180 kilometres west of Bukavu on a mission to resupply the Mayi-Mayi and ex-FAR/Interahamwe.

23. Early in September, a force apparently comprising armed groups captured the town of Fizi near Lake Tanganyika. Apparently, forces of the Front pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) were preparing to launch an attack on Burundi from that area. RCD indicated to MONUC that, early in October, there were several clashes between RCD/RPA and FDD/Interahamwe in the area surrounding Fizi. Reportedly, RCD, RPA and Burundian forces have since retaken this strategic location. Significant movements of RPA troops on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were reported in connection with this objective.

24. Early on 29 September, armed elements, believed to be Mayi-Mayi militia, attacked Kindu. The attacks appeared to be aimed at the RPA command headquarters and the airport. The attacks were repulsed the same morning and the situation was brought under control by RCD troops occupying the town. The fighting resulted in a number of casualties among combatants and civilians. The MONUC sector commander tried to conduct an investigation of the incident, but the RPA authorities initially did not allow him to land in Kindu.

25. On 16 August, a MONUC helicopter was hit by 14 bullets, fired by unidentified armed men, as it flew between Uvira and Kalemie. It was able to land safely. Later, on 3 September, a MONUC patrol was held up and robbed at Mouchouchi (6 km along the Bukavu-Walungu road) by unidentified armed men. On 27 September, a locally recruited MONUC staff member in Goma was found dead in circumstances that suggested armed robbery.

Status of deployment of the Mission

26. As at 15 October, MONUC had a total of 2,408 military personnel including 540 staff officers and military observers as well as 1,868 infantry personnel (see annex). Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in addition to Kinshasa, liaison officers continue to be deployed with the headquarters of rebel movements (Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma) and a further 23 remain stationed in the capitals of surrounding countries, including 16 officers as planning support to the Joint Military Commission. There is now a total of 77 military observer teams inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, of which 46 are static and 31 are mobile. The static teams are placed at 41 new defensive positions, while mobile teams operate from sector headquarters and other locations, to provide a quick response to reported ceasefire violations. MONUC intends to enhance its overall monitoring capacity by increasing the number of monitoring teams to 91, of which 61 will be static and 30 mobile.

27. MONUC is also in the process of establishing four coordination centres, which will provide command and control for the military observers in areas distant from the sector headquarters and will improve the logistical support in the interior of the country, in addition to providing an enhanced medical evacuation capacity and increased forward mobility. The four coordination centres, located at Ilebo, Basankusu, Boende and Manono, should be completed by the end of the year.

Disengagement and redeployment of forces

28. MONUC has completed the verification of disengagement and redeployment of the parties, to the extent possible in the current circumstances. Effectively, 95 out of 96 new defensive positions have been verified and this element of the Lusaka process is therefore at an end. However, the new defensive positions of the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) at Emate-Loa, Abunakombo, Losombo and Djefera can still not be occupied as the MLC forces are maintaining administrative and police control over them. The matter of FAC troops occupying Bakambe (35 km north of Mbuji Mayi) and Tshilunde (20 km north of Mbuji Mayi) has also yet to be resolved.

29. Significant progress has been achieved in the south-eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The only unverified new defensive position in

this sector is at Kamesha and RCD has stated that it does not intend to occupy it. However, there have been some violations of the disengagement plan at Moliro, Pweto and Mani. A MONUC team was dispatched to a new RCD defensive position at Moliro on 10 September, and reported a FAC force there, containing army, navy and air force elements. At the Political Committee meeting held on 14 and 15 September, the Force Commander of MONUC, Major General Mountaga Diallo, and the Chairman of the Joint Military Commission were given the task of resolving this issue and other matters, in coordination with the parties.

Withdrawal of foreign forces

30. The Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) has largely withdrawn from the Equateur Province, leaving behind some elements in Lisala. However, UPDF has declared that it will maintain one battalion in Buta and two in the Ruwenzori Mountains in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, until a peace agreement is reached. They are also leaving a small force of around two companies in Gbadolite. The Namibian authorities indicated that they have already withdrawn their troops except for a small element still in Kinshasa and another stuck at Kamina because of logistical difficulties. The Zimbabwean Defence Force has declared the withdrawal of three battalions from Equateur Province and the eastern part of the country, but MONUC has yet to confirm this withdrawal. There have been no withdrawals by RPA. On 2 October, the Minister of Defence of Angola stated that his country was ready to leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Cooperation with the Mission

31. The parties continue to provide satisfactory security for MONUC military and civilian personnel and, in almost every case where MONUC teams have deployed, the local populations have welcomed them.

32. After mounting negative information campaigns against MONUC in the past, RCD adopted a more positive approach when it agreed to allow the Mission to hold an information campaign at Kisangani on 17 August 2001. This provided an opportunity to meet over 300 people and raise the Mission's profile in the local community. A similar event was held at Basankusu on 27 August 2001 in MLC-controlled territory.

33. In September, MONUC deployed to Uvira, Bukavu and Beni to enhance its ability to monitor the situation and investigate allegations of ceasefire violations; 127 of a total of 147 ceasefire allegations were filed by RCD, mainly against armed groups. However, 87 of those allegations could not be investigated by MONUC largely owing to the lack of timely security guarantees by RCD or the difficulty in identifying locations.

34. At the same time, RCD insisted on levying taxes on MONUC contractors, contrary to the status-of-forces agreement, the legal basis for MONUC operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The refusal of RCD to accept this legal regime, and the Mission's insistence on the exoneration of its contractors from taxes, has in effect led to a blockage of fuel supplies for MONUC operations in Goma. Following several high-level meetings with RCD, the issue now appears to have been resolved. On 4 October, RCD also announced that it would allow humanitarian barges to navigate freely in waters under its control.

35. In recent weeks, MONUC has been approached by numerous groups and individuals claiming to represent the Mayi-Mayi, an ill-defined term generally applied to local armed Congolese groups in opposition to Rwandan forces. Some Mayi-Mayi groups appear to be willing to work with RCD, while others appear to be closer to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With the information currently available, it is difficult to assess the size and nature of the Mayi-Mayi phenomenon. The Mayi-Mayi are seeking representation in the inter-Congolese dialogue, and appear to have been involved in recent outbreaks of fighting in the east, particularly around Fizi and Kindu. MONUC is seeking to broaden and deepen its contacts with their representatives.

Combatants assembled at Kamina

36. During my visit to Kinshasa, President Kabila invited MONUC to visit Kamina camp, in Katanga Province, where some 3,000 men, said to be Rwandan combatants, were reportedly located. On 12 September, a MONUC team conducted a preliminary visit to the camp, with a view to establishing the identity and status of the combatants. Approximately 1,500 men, who were uniformed but carried no arms, were presented to the MONUC team.

37. At its request, the MONUC team was accompanied by representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government delegation was led by the Minister for Security, Mwenze Kongolo, who included in his party members of a Rwandan group called the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Some members of the diplomatic corps participated in the visit. FDLR portrayed itself as the representative of the combatants at Kamina and stated a number of political demands aimed at the Government of Rwanda.

38. The senior officer of the soldiers assembled at Kamina declared that they had given up their arms and wished to return to their country. He repeated largely the same political demands that had been put forward by FDLR. MONUC indicated that it intends to conduct a thorough survey of the men to determine their exact identity and status. Steps have been taken to establish a military/civilian team at Kamina for that purpose.

Situation in Kisangani

39. RCD continues to reject the demilitarization of Kisangani and maintains forces there, allegedly to counter the threat by the Mayi-Mayi and FAC. However, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no intention of occupying Kisangani in the event of its demilitarization. In general, RCD continues to be suspicious of the motives for the demand to demilitarize Kisangani, despite the fact that it is aware that it could maintain administrative and police control of the town in the absence of military forces.

Cooperation with the Joint Military Commission

40. The Joint Military Commission, at its plenary meeting held on 5 and 6 September, approved the co-location of the Commission with MONUC. This was later endorsed by the Political Committee, the date of the move to be determined after the signing of a mission status agreement between the Joint Military Commission and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The move is to be completed by 31 October.

IV. Humanitarian aspects

41. The humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be very grave, which underlines the urgency of efforts to restore peace to the country. A recent study by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund revealed that the vast majority of the population of 50 million people live on the equivalent of US$ 0.20 per person per day, and consume less than two thirds of the daily calories needed to maintain good health. Approximately 70 per cent of the population has little or no access to health care. The World Food Programme has estimated that 16 million Congolese have critical food needs. At the same time, humanitarian agencies have access to less than half of the estimated 2,041,000 displaced people in the country. Ongoing security constraints, particularly in Ituri and South Kivu, have left large numbers of people without external assistance. The kidnapping of a relief worker in the Ruzizi Plains area of South Kivu in September, although quickly resolved, highlights the difficult operating environment for humanitarian agencies.

42. On 22 May, in Mbandaka, the Security Council mission declared the River Congo open, so as to stimulate the resumption of trade, encourage greater contact between communities and improve humanitarian access. To follow this initiative, MONUC organized a donor-funded "peace boat", which transported 600 tons of medical, school and other relief supplies from Kinshasa to Mongalu in northern Equateur. The peace boat left Kinshasa on 31 July and returned on 31 August, carrying 900 tons of maize purchased by the European Union for distribution in Kinshasa.

43. The Democratic Republic of the Congo received two significant influxes of refugees in recent months. In the wake of the attempted coup in the Central African Republic in May 2001, approximately 25,000 people sought refuge in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the area around Zongo in northern Equateur. They were accompanied by approximately 1,200 ex-combatants. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and MONUC are taking steps to separate the two groups. Increased UNITA attacks in northern Angola sent two waves of refugees across the border at Kimvula. Nine thousand people crossed into the Democratic Republic of the

Congo in mid-August, and another 3,000 in early October. UNHCR and its partners are working with local authorities to identify camp sites and re-locate the refugees. There are now approximately 193,000 Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who make up more than half of the 360,000 refugees in the country.

44. From 10 to 14 August, the Executive Director of UNICEF, Carol Bellamy, visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the second round of polio national immunization days. While approximately 10 million children were vaccinated against polio, the immunization days were also marked by several security incidents and the inability to access all parts of the country.

V. Human rights

Government-controlled territory

45. The Government has made some progress in establishing human rights laws and standards. Some non-judicial detention centres notorious for torture and extrajudicial killings have been closed, and there is a growing awareness on the part of the authorities of the need for democratic decision-making, good governance and respect for the rule of law.

46. Human rights abuses continue, however. Despite the adoption of a law liberalizing political activities, registered political parties were prevented from conducting political activities on the grounds that they lacked the necessary prerequisites for approval. Moreover, human rights activists and journalists are being held in detention for speaking out on political issues. Police harassment and the raiding of homes of political opponents have continued, and it is reported that many detainees are held without a duly executed warrant and rarely appear in court to be formally charged. There are also reports of the continuing use of torture in detention centres, many of which are not open to the public.

47. The Government has not yet honoured its commitment to suspend executions and abolish the death penalty. The Court of Military Order continues to impose the death penalty, and defendants have no right of appeal and at times no access to legal representation. Most recently, the Court at Likasi sentenced to death nine persons accused of plotting a failed coup against the late President. The Special Rapporteur for human rights, Roberto Garretón, and human rights organizations, have remarked upon irregularities during the trials.

48. It has also been reported that, since February 2001, some 80 persons are being detained in a prison in Makala in connection with the assassination of the late President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The detainees are reportedly being denied medical care and regular meals, and are said to be in poor health.

Territory controlled by the Front de libération du Congo

49. The human rights situation in FLC-controlled territory continues to deteriorate. Clashes between armed groups have intensified, and the wave of refugees from the Central African Republic into Equateur Province, many with arms, has contributed to the concern about human rights.

50. There have also been extremely disturbing reports about the situation in Aru, Ituri Province, where some 750 civilians have reportedly been massacred within a six-week period. The deaths are reportedly motivated by suspicion of witchcraft, although other reports indicate that they may be politically and ethnically motivated.

Territory controlled by the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie

51. In the eastern provinces, reports have been received that RCD authorities continue to intimidate and harass human rights activists and to make arbitrary arrests. The media are still restricted, and the property of the media is confiscated. It has been reported that in Mboko-Swima and in Fizi (Uvira), RCD soldiers engaged in the rape of women and young girls. In Uvira, there have been reports of forced recruitment of young men into the army.

52. In North and South Kivu Provinces, the Mayi-Mayi, Interahamwe and the Banyamulenge security forces have reportedly conducted a reign of terror and brutal repression, as well as massacres against sympathizers or even persons suspected of sympathizing with opposing camps.

53. In general, refugee and internally displaced women are often preyed upon by armed elements and have been the victims of torture, sexual and other abuse and ethnically motivated killings. Rape has been used

as a weapon of war. The situation is particularly dire in the eastern provinces. The recruitment of able-bodied males into armed forces and factions have left households headed by women and girls to fend for themselves in a country whose economy and infrastructure has been decimated by years of war. The United Nations continues to draw the attention of the Government, the leadership of the armed groups and local authorities to the need to improve the human rights situation.

VI. Child protection

54. During the reporting period UNICEF and MONUC coordinated through a national implementing non-governmental organization partner, SOS Grands Lacs, the successful repatriation of demobilized child soldiers from Uganda to Ituri Province, where they were reunited with their families. Demobilization orders and the necessary travel documents were obtained from FLC and the Ugandan authorities. The children and their families received a repatriation package and were reintegrated into their communities where they are receiving schooling, vocational training and other assistance.

55. In Kisangani, commitments from local authorities were obtained to set up a local commission for the demobilization of child soldiers, and UNICEF and MONUC have begun interviewing child soldiers, having been granted access to the military camps for that purpose. MONUC and UNICEF have also organized workshops and training and counselling sessions on treatment of war-traumatized children for local administrative and military authorities and civil society.

56. In Kinshasa, MONUC, UNICEF, the International Labour Organization and the Bureau national pour la démobilisation et la réinsertion participated in planning for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of vulnerable groups. Several workshops and seminars were organized by UNICEF in Kinshasa concerning the demobilization and reinsertion of child soldiers, as part of the sensitization campaign launched by President Kabila. Following acts of violence against street children in Kinshasa, MONUC and UNICEF met with the Minister for Social Affairs and Family to attempt to develop a comprehensive strategy to address the large numbers of street children in Kinshasa and other provincial cities.

57. MONUC continues to receive reports of recruitment and training of children especially in the east of the country by all of the groups. Moreover, despite some verbal understandings, militia groups have yet to express their full commitment to halting the recruitment of children.

VII. HIV/AIDS

58. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), the MONUC health cell has been assigned specific responsibilities for the prevention of HIV/AIDS. To date, MONUC has elaborated a prevention programme based on a permanent information and education campaign and the free distribution of condoms. This programme will be integrated into UNAIDS programmes.

VIII. Next steps

Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration

59. MONUC has nearly completed the second phase of its deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and is now faced with the challenges of the third phase. The main tasks to be accomplished by the parties and requiring the assistance of MONUC during that phase include the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups. It will also be necessary to find durable solutions to the problem of the armed groups, including the repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants into society.

60. During my meetings with Presidents Kabila and Kagame, I highlighted the steps necessary to make progress in this area. Clearly, the problem of the armed groups cannot be solved by force. The objective of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme is therefore to create an environment, especially in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which will encourage the combatants and their families to take a step towards a better life without weapons.

61. The vital elements of such an environment would be continuing adherence to the ceasefire and the cessation of military assistance to the armed groups. It

would also be essential that all parties extend their full cooperation to MONUC, especially when it deploys eastwards to the region where most armed groups operate. Without such cooperation and the necessary transparency by the parties in exchanging information on the armed groups, MONUC would not be in a position to assess the scope of the problem and define the extent of its assistance to the process.

62. In addition to an environment conducive to a successful disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme, it would be important for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to continue their dialogue, which should lead to a firm political understanding on the disarmament to reintegration process and the establishment of a joint coordination mechanism. Such a mechanism would serve as a useful partner for the international community and enable it to support the process through practical assistance and funding. It is encouraging that both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda have set up national mechanisms. What is needed, however, is a joint approach that would ensure fully coordinated planning and, subsequently, a seamless transition from disarmament to repatriation, reinsertion and reintegration.

63. The objective would be to repatriate Rwandan former combatants to Rwanda as soon as possible after they are disarmed, rather than accommodating them for long periods in camps on Congolese territory. Screening of ex-combatants would largely be organized by the host country with the support of the United Nations. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that some members of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe took part in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. At the same time, however, a majority of armed group members in the east are not wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and many may be seeking ways of returning home to resume their lives in peace.

64. The United Nations has discussed with the Government of Rwanda means of pursuing this approach in close cooperation with donors, in order to encourage the combatants to return to their own country in conditions of safety and security, and with full respect for due process, which may include traditional methods of settling disputes. During my visit to Kigali, President Kagame reiterated his Government's willingness to accept the repatriation of Rwandan combatants now in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United Nations would be prepared to assist in seeking the considerable donor funding needed to support the Rwandan institutions responsible for carrying out reinsertion and reintegration.

65. In preparing for activities relating to the disarmament to reintegration process, it must be recalled that the armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo did not sign the Lusaka Agreement and continue to take part in armed hostilities. Relatively few details are known about their activities and intentions. MONUC has had almost no contact with their leaders. It will be necessary to continue to gather as much information about them as possible as deployment proceeds. I expect the parties to assist MONUC in the gathering of such information.

66. While the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of Rwandan armed groups on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains a vital element of the peace process, there are also armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo for whom political solutions need to be found as early as possible. Such groups include the Mayi-Mayi, ethnic-based Congolese militias and Burundian rebels.

Role of the United Nations

67. It is currently envisaged that the main role of MONUC in phase III would be to establish temporary reception centres where combatants could surrender their weapons, to be destroyed by MONUC in situ. The disarmed combatants would then undergo the first stages of demobilization. MONUC anticipates that many combatants will be accompanied by their dependants. It is therefore important that arrangements be made, in close coordination with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, to meet the immediate needs of the women and children accompanying the combatants.

68. As stated above, MONUC would anticipate conducting only the initial stages of demobilization on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo before the disarmed combatants are transported back to Rwanda for reinsertion and reintegration. During those initial stages, at the reception centres, MONUC and the humanitarian agencies would facilitate the provision to the combatants and their dependants of civilian clothing; ablutions facilities; a medical examination and medical treatment if needed; and food and camp-

style accommodation for the period of their stay, which should be as short as possible.

69. In cooperation with the Government of Rwanda, MONUC would also anticipate sending, in due course, human rights and public information officers to Rwanda to make regular visits to the reinsertion camps. Part of the MONUC public information campaign in phase III would involve persuading the combatants in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that the Government of Rwanda was prepared to accept most of them back with full regard for due process.

Coordination

70. While MONUC is ready to assume a coordinating role in organizing the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration effort, it has neither the means nor the mandate to undertake many of the practical tasks associated with it (camp management, medical support, provision of food, water and sanitation, reintegration projects etc.) For this, MONUC will need to rely on United Nations programmes and agencies, the World Bank and non-governmental organizations support, and is setting up a consultative mechanism in Kinshasa with all stakeholders. A similar mechanism will be established at United Nations Headquarters to reinforce the existing Planning and Management Task Force chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

71. The World Bank, in consultation with the United Nations, Governments in the region, donors and other partners, is currently working towards the establishment of a multi-country programme of demobilization and reintegration in the Great Lakes region. A World Bank team held talks with the Government of Rwanda in connection with this initiative. The aims of such an umbrella programme include substantive exchanges between country projects in the region and a consistent approach to the needs of the countries involved. The World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are seeking financial contributions and technical support from donors and United Nations partners in the process. A number of donors have already pledged financial support and others are expected to do so shortly.

72. In order to contribute to a better understanding of the problems relating to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, UNDP led a mapping and programming mission to Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda from 6 August to 13 September 2001. MONUC and UNDP need to continue to work closely together, in view of the many infrastructural and development tasks which are directly relevant to the peace process and to ensure that the reintegration aspects of the process are adequately addressed at an early stage. MONUC is setting up an integrated unit for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, which will play a catalytic and coordinating role and form the core of a consultative mechanism involving United Nations organizations and programmes, the World Bank, bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations.

Step-by-step deployment

73. The United Nations is determined to do what it can to maintain the momentum in the peace process, including further deployments of MONUC into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The overall security situation in the eastern part of the country and the logistical constraints of deploying them are such that MONUC has no choice but to adopt a step-by-step approach. It will have to assess carefully before each step developments in the security situation and the political climate. In addition, it should ensure at all times that it can provide an adequate level of logistical support to United Nations peacekeepers in the field.

74. The Mission's initial objective in phase III would be to establish a mixed civilian and military presence, as well as a forward support base, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. This would probably contribute, as it has in other areas where MONUC has deployed, to a sense of security among the population and to a progressive resumption of economic and social activity in that part of the country. In addition, it would provide MONUC with the necessary access and information to start and support a process of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration.

75. The proposed operational and logistics base would be established at Kindu, which is located at the western fringe of an area characterized by many of the military, security, political and humanitarian and human rights problems that MONUC is likely to be confronted with in phase III. Kindu would thus serve, together with the existing MONUC bases at Kalemie

and Goma, as the main hub for activities within the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The initial deployment of United Nations personnel at Kindu would include a military engineering capability, accompanied by a protection unit, to prepare for possible further expansions of the Mission in the east. It would also be necessary to progressively deploy civilian staff, including political, humanitarian, human rights, public information and child protection personnel, and members of the Mission's disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration unit. In addition to the deployment to Kindu, MONUC should also be prepared eventually to strengthen significantly both its presence (up to two infantry battalions) and civilian elements in Kisangani, as soon as the city is demilitarized by RCD.

76. The location of Kindu was selected for various political, security and logistical considerations. To ensure that the MONUC deployment there can be supported properly and at a reasonable cost, it would be important to rehabilitate as soon as possible the rail/river link between Kisangani and Kindu. Until surface transportation links are established, the deployment and sustainment of the United Nations presence at Kindu will be done by air, which significantly limits the United Nations ability to deploy a sizeable force, and also involves significant costs.

77. Once MONUC has commenced operations at Kindu and in surrounding areas, it would be able, subject to the full cooperation of the parties, to assist in the disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups. Because of the voluntary nature of the exercise, those operations can commence only when the necessary political and security conditions have been created by the parties and when it is judged that the armed groups are ready to undergo disarmament and demobilization. I intend to make the necessary recommendations to the Security Council at the appropriate time, including an estimate of the additional resources that would be required.

Concept of operations

78. In the meantime, the implementation of the proposal to deploy at Kindu will require the gradual establishment of a forward force headquarters and infantry and engineer units, with an initial strength of up to 400 all ranks. This initial group, some elements of which would be redeployed from existing MONUC positions, will have specific responsibility for establishing the necessary infrastructure for subsequent deployments. It will be stationed at the airport of Kindu. If authorized, this initial deployment could be completed by the beginning of 2002. At that point, the Mission's total military strength would be at about 3,800 all ranks.

79. During the early stages of phase III, the military component will have the following tasks:

(a) To prepare for planned future deployments;

(b) To enhance the security of United Nations personnel and assets;

(c) To investigate allegations of ceasefire violations, including those committed by armed groups;

(d) To gather and analyse information, particularly concerning the location, numbers, movements, activities and motivations of the armed groups and their dependants;

(e) To establish and maintain contacts with local authorities, including traditional authorities and, eventually, with the leadership of the armed groups and their dependants;

(f) To encourage and facilitate early disarmament and demobilization;

(g) To conduct confidence-building activities.

80. A risk assessment has been performed, taking into account the likely threat from a number of sources, including foreign armed groups, foreign regular forces, Congolese armed groups, hostage-taking, landmines, terrain, weather and health risks. The military force to be deployed at Kindu in due course will need to be sufficiently robust. Accordingly, it is envisaged to expand the initial deployment of 400 military personnel gradually to a task force of some 1,100 to 1,200 troops comprising a headquarters unit, an infantry battalion and an aviation regiment, plus a forward force support unit of about 800 all ranks. The aviation regiment would be equipped with enough aircraft, including armed helicopters, to airlift a 120-strong infantry company and its equipment in a single lift. The infantry battalion group would comprise four rifle companies, mortar and anti-tank platoons, and headquarters, signals and other operational units, as well as transport, medical, maintenance and catering personnel. In due course, the total military strength at Kindu would thus be around 2,000 personnel.

81. A number of specialized units would also be deployed at Kindu, including engineering; railway repair; riverine and ferry services; transportation, water production and signals, together with a guard unit. Additional military observer teams numbering about 48 men (12 four-officer teams) will also be based at Kindu. Subject to authorization by the Security Council and a favourable response on the part of troop-contributing countries, it is envisaged that this gradual deployment will be completed in the course of 2002.

82. Operating within the vicinity of United Nations forces at Kindu, Kalemie and Goma, MONUC civilian personnel would work with the local population and the local authorities to increase humanitarian access; draw attention to human rights problems in an effort to dissipate the climate of impunity that is widespread in the east; gather information about and make initial contact with the armed groups and their dependants; keep the local population informed, through radio broadcasts, about the nature, activities and intentions of MONUC; and refine planning and preparations for the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, including child soldiers.

83. The creation of an enabling environment by the parties is a crucial condition for the forward deployment of MONUC. In this regard, I should like to once again emphasize the responsibility of the parties for the security of United Nations personnel and their freedom of movement. Without these elements in place, MONUC cannot do its work. The Mission has already received general assurances from RCD regarding its deployment to Kindu. It is hoped that further and more detailed assurances will be given by RCD and other parties as MONUC expands its presence in the areas under their control.

Civilian police

84. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1341 (2001), arrangements are being made to deploy a small contingent of up to 15 civilian police officers to MONUC headquarters. The primary tasks of the civilian police component during this initial phase will be to develop contacts with the internal security and police organs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to plan and recommend options for an expanded civilian police component. United Nations civilian police will also prepare options for a possible role in Kisangani.

85. In preparation for the planned deployment, civilian police experts conducted a field visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August during which they met with senior Government and police officials. The Government stated that it would welcome a civilian police deployment and requested professional police advice to help it to re-establish law and order throughout the country.

Public information

86. The public information component of MONUC is being expanded to prepare for the establishment of a United Nations radio network capable of broadcasting to the entire country. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has recently concluded a memorandum of understanding for this purpose with the Fondation Hirondelle, a Swiss non-governmental organization. Both the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and RCD-Goma have agreed to support this initiative. FM transmitters and production studios are to be installed at Kinshasa, Kisangani, Mbandaka, Kananga, Kalemie and Goma. A shortwave transmitter will also be installed at Kinshasa. Programming will be transmitted by satellite to the regional stations, which will produce content for local broadcasts. The first transmitter in Kinshasa is expected to be operational by the end of 2001, and the entire network should be completed by the end of May 2002.

87. The radio will provide accurate, credible and impartial information about all aspects of the peace process, including military and political developments, the inter-Congolese dialogue and the many humanitarian assistance programmes operating in the country. As the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo grow to trust this source of information, it is expected that their understanding of and support for the peace process will deepen, thereby facilitating the work of the mission.

IX. Financial aspects

88. The General Assembly, by its resolution 55/275 of 14 June 2001, appropriated an initial amount of $200 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2001 pending submission of my proposed budget for the Mission for the full 12-month financial period ending 30 June 2002.

89. My proposed budget for MONUC is in preparation and will take full account of the significant additional resource requirements arising from the concept of operations outlined in this report, should the Security Council authorize MONUC to enter phase III of its deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I shall request the General Assembly to take action on the budget during its fifty-sixth session.

90. Since its establishment in October 1999, the Trust Fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has received voluntary contributions amounting to $1.1 million, with expenditures authorized to date in the amount of $0.4 million.

91. As at 30 September 2001, unpaid assessed contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to $246.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $3,291.9 million.

X. Observations

92. Despite difficulties, the overall situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be favourable. The ceasefire along the confrontation line has held since January. The disengagement of forces and their redeployment to new defensive positions is almost complete, and some foreign forces have been withdrawn from the country.

93. The dangerous and persistent outbreaks of fighting in the east are very disturbing, however. During my visit to the region in September, I urged Presidents Kabila and Kagame to exert all their influence to bring the fighting to an end. Although much of the fighting in the east is attributed to armed groups, I strongly believe that much more can and should be done by the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement to stop it. Any military and logistical support provided to those armed groups should cease without delay. The proposals I have outlined above can be carried out only if the parties continue to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process and work with MONUC to establish a climate conducive to a complete cessation of hostilities.

94. At the same time, I welcome the withdrawal of Namibian and many of the Ugandan troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Namibia is the first signatory of the Lusaka Agreement to withdraw its forces in accordance with the Agreement. I encourage Uganda to complete the repatriation of its remaining forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also urge Rwanda and other Governments concerned to accelerate their preparations to withdraw their troops, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000).

95. The Government of Rwanda has declared that it is prepared to reinsert Rwandan former combatants into society in their own country. This would make a significant contribution to the process of healing the deep wounds caused by the genocide seven years ago. The United Nations stands ready to assist in this process.

96. I commend the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue and his team for the remarkable success of the preparatory meeting held at Gaborone from 20 to 24 August. I earnestly hope that the formal commencement of the dialogue in Addis Ababa will enable the Congolese parties, including political parties and civil society, to address the key questions that need to be answered as they contemplate a return to peace: national reconciliation, the nature of governance in their country, relations with their neighbours to the east and to the south, and relations between different communities within the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself. I trust that the parties concerned will ensure an adequate representation of Congolese women in the dialogue.

97. The most important tasks, however, still lie ahead. The Congolese parties must demonstrate their continuing commitment to the dialogue and cooperate fully with the facilitator and his team. At the same time, the support and assistance of the international community will continue to be needed.

98. Accordingly, to sustain the momentum in the peace process it is recommended that the Security Council authorize MONUC to enter phase III of its deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the concept of operations outlined in paragraphs 59 to 87 above. The initial deployment of MONUC troops in Kindu will remain within the limit of 5,537 military personnel authorized by the Council in resolution 1291 (2000). Preparations are under way for recruitment and deployment of adequate numbers of United Nations civilian personnel to accompany the military deployment, including political, human rights, humanitarian, child protection, public information,

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and logistical personnel.

99. In making these recommendations, I am fully aware of the political and security risks and high financial costs involved in the next steps necessary to keep the peace process moving forward in a decisive manner. However, it is my sincere belief that the international community will be willing to take these steps, despite the associated risks and costs, in the expectation that the parties to the conflicts, both inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo and within the region, will fully shoulder their moral and political responsibilities to end the suffering of the population, which has gone on too long. In particular, the parties to the Lusaka Agreement must engage in a genuine and constructive dialogue. Their performance will obviously be a factor in the pace of United Nations deployment forward and in the contribution it can make. In this respect, I also count on the continuing support of interested Member States to encourage, assist and, where necessary, prod the parties to pursue the peace process resolutely.

100. The need to advance the peace process and to end the fighting is all the more pressing as serious human rights violations continue to occur, and humanitarian conditions for millions of Congolese and in the whole region very often remain extremely poor. I call upon the Governments in the region to explore new and bold steps, which would promote human rights, good governance, national reconciliation, movement towards democracy, and social and economic recovery.

101. Significant practical assistance and funding will also be required for peace-related operations within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, not least for the rehabilitation of the vital surface transportation links described in this report. I note that some major donors have already begun to express interest in evaluating and financing these projects which, taken together, would ultimately reconnect the deep interior of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and, in a wider sense, with the rest of the world. The pressing issue of the demilitarization of Kisangani remains a key objective of the international community, and its realization would also greatly contribute to the revitalization of Congolese society and economy.

102. The challenges ahead and their complexity will require that the United Nations organizations and programmes, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions, enhance their coordination and assist each other's efforts in practical ways. I intend to strengthen the existing cooperation between those entities, with a view to achieving a precise division of labour in the Great Lakes region. Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration and the rehabilitation of infrastructure are inextricably linked to the peace process and, therefore, pose new challenges of coordination for the international community.

103. In recognition of the complex situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Burundian armed groups form an intricate part of the military and political landscape, as well as of the obvious links that exist between some aspects of the Lusaka process and events in Burundi, I believe the time has come for the parties to the Lusaka process to explore means of associating Burundi more closely with the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

104. Finally, I wish to express my deep appreciation to my former Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kamel Morjane, for all his achievements at the head of MONUC, and to wish him every success in his new responsibilities. I also express my thanks to the Force Commander, General Mountaga Diallo, and my full confidence in my new Special Representative, Namanga Ngongi, as he sets about his important tasks. My appreciation also goes to all the women and men of MONUC, both military and civilian, for the contribution they continue to make to the restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Annex

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: current strength and contributing countries

(as at 15 October 2001)

	Military observers	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*
Algeria	13			13
Bangladesh	11	8		19
Benin	17	3		20
Belgium		5		5
Bolivia		1		1
Burkina Faso	11			11
Cameroon		1		1
Canada	1	5		6
China	10			10
Czech Republic	4	1		5
Denmark	1	1		2
Egypt	25	1		26
France	1	2	3	6
Ghana	10			10
India	25	3		28
Indonesia	4	3		7
Ireland	2			2
Italy		3		3
Jordan	22	6		28
Kenya	16	10		26
Malawi	16			16
Malaysia	7	11		18
Mali	1			1
Morocco		4	614	618
Mozambique	2			2
Nepal	13	1		14
Niger	12	1		13
Nigeria	21	1		22
Pakistan	17	16		33
Paraguay	11			11
Peru	3			3
Poland	3			3
Romania	21			21
Russian Federation	18			18

	Military observers	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*
Senegal	9	16	539	564
South Africa	1	8	88	97
Sweden	2			2
Switzerland		1		1
Tunisia	19	4	219	242
Ukraine	9	1		10
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland		4		4
United Republic of Tanzania	4			4
Uruguay	26	18	405	449
Zambia	9	4		13
Total	**397**	**143**	**1 868**	**2 408**

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United Nations A/ES-10/117–S/2001/971

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 16 October 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

At dawn on Sunday, 14 October 2001 (Palestine time), Israeli occupying forces assassinated Mr. Abdel Rahman Hammad in the town of Qalqilya while he stood on the roof of his home after prayers. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, while admitting to what he called "liquidating" the person, said that this was "not the first, nor the last", of such operations. The Prime Minister thus publicly admitted responsibility for yet another war crime committed by the occupying Power.

Also on Sunday, Israeli occupying forces withdrew from the parts of Al-Khalil (Hebron) they had reoccupied for more than 10 days, but only after causing terror, destruction and death in that part of the city. The chief of staff of the Israeli army took an unusual and inappropriate step by saying in a statement that he "opposes the evacuation of the El-Sheikh and Abu Sneineh districts as well as measures to ease the blockade, which could threaten the security of Israeli citizens and soldiers". This is the same chief of staff, which we have indicated in some of our previous letters to you, who may have a special responsibility, along with several other Israeli officials, for the many war crimes and atrocities committed against the Palestinian people. The statement also reflects the strong opposition by some influential army officers and government officials against any improvement of the situation on the ground.

Another assassination was committed yesterday, 15 October 2001, by Israeli occupying forces, who killed Mr. Mohammed Marshood in the city of Nablus. The resumption of the practice and policy of assassination by Israel, the occupying Power, in addition to being a war crime, seems to aim at forcing yet another explosion of the situation on the ground. This must be ceased immediately and the Israeli Government must be held responsible.

I am writing this letter in follow-up to our previous 72 letters addressed to you regarding this grave and ongoing situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 5 October 2001 (A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984;

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A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669; A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686; A/ES-10/96-S/2001/697; A/ES-10/97-S/2001/708; A/ES-10/98-S/2001/717; A/ES-10/99-S/2001/742; A/ES-10/100-S/2001/754; A/ES-10/101-S/2001/783; A/ES-10/102-S/2001/785; A/ES-10/103-S/2001/798; A/ES-10/104-S/2001/812; A/ES-10/105-S/2001/814; A/ES-10/107-S/2001/821; A/ES-10/108-S/2001/826; A/ES-10/111-S/2001/880; A/ES-10/112-S/2001/918; A/ES-10/114-S/2001/928; A/ES-10/115-S/2001/932; and A/ES-10/116-S/2001/941). Since our last letter to you, on 5 October 2001, Israeli occupying forces have brutally killed 8 more Palestinians, including the martyrs mentioned above, bringing the total number of Palestinian martyrs to 682. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to the present letter.) In addition, the number of Palestinians injured by the fire and action of the Israeli occupying forces continues to rise.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 16 October 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem* (Saturday, 6 October, through Monday, 15 October 2001)

Saturday, 6 October 2001

1. Hamzah Salem Al-Qawasmi
2. Amjad Ibrahim Al-Qawasmi

Sunday, 7 October 2001

Ra'ed Bahjat Al-Sharif

Monday, 8 October 2001

Abdel Rahman Ahmed Abu Areeban

Wednesday, 10 October 2001

Mohammed Saleh Abu Al-Rous

Thursday, 11 October 2001

Hani Mustafa Rawajbah

Sunday, 14 October 2001

Abdel Rahman Hammad

Monday, 15 October 2001

Mohammed Marshood

* Total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 682.

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Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 62
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 16 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 18 June 2001 (A/55/990-S/2001/599), I have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention, and to protest in the strongest possible manner, to new massive violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia perpetrated by military aircraft of the Turkish air force, recorded on 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 27 June, 2, 4, 5, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 July, 1, 9, 16, 18, 28 and 29 August, as well as, on 5, 17, 21, 25, 26 and 28 September 2001.

On 6 June, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 12.30 hours, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and international air traffic regulations, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape Apostolos Andreas), before exiting in a south-easterly direction, at 13.22 hours. The aircraft returned later and once again illegally entered the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus at 15.53 hours, flying over the area of Karpasia, before exiting towards the Ankara FIR at 16.48 hours.

On 7 June, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 12.43 hours, violating the Cypriot sovereign airspace and international air traffic regulations and flew over the Karpasia region before it exited flying in the direction of the Ankara FIR at 13.34 hours.

On 10 June, the following violations occurred:

(a) One Turkish air force CN-235 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 10.07 hours, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tympou in the occupied area of the Republic. At 13.07 hours, the aircraft departed and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR, at 13.25 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR;

(b) One Turkish air force CN-235 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 06.09 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region,

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exited the Nicosia FIR at 06.55 hours in a south-easterly direction. On the same day, the same aircraft re-entered the FIR at 14.02 hours and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR at 15.01 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR.

On 12 June, one Turkish air force C-160 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.58 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region and international air traffic regulations, exited the Nicosia FIR in a south-easterly direction, at 12.46 hours.

On 13 June, at 10.48 hours four Turkish air force F-16 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR in one formation and exited en route to the Ankara FIR at 10.55 hours.

On 17 June, one Turkish air force CN-235 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 16.32 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Kyrenia region and international air traffic regulations, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 19.13 hours.

On 18 June, one Turkish air force CN-235 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 08.08 hours and, having violated Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Kyrenia region, exited the FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 09.55 hours. On the same day, one Turkish air force B-200 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 10.38 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal Tympou airport at 10.56 hours. At 12.26 hours, the aircraft departed and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR at 12.39 hours.

On 20 June, one Turkish air force C-160 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 07.38 hours and exited at 08.24 hours in a southerly direction. At 13.06 hours, the aircraft re-entered the Nicosia FIR illegally and exited en route to the Ankara FIR at 13.44 hours. On the same day one Turkish air force C-130 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 12.27 hours and, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and international air traffic regulations, flew over the Karpasia region and exited the Nicosia FIR, in a south-easterly direction, at 13.08 hours. At 17.24 hours, the aircraft re-entered the Nicosia FIR illegally and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 18.08 hours.

On 21 June, one Turkish airforce F-4 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 15.16 hours and, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and international air traffic regulations, flew over the Karpasia region and exited the Nicosia FIR at 15.38 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR.

On 27 June, four Turkish air force F-4 aircraft, in one formation, illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.43 hours and exited at 11.56 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR, in a south-westerly direction, violating international air traffic regulations.

On 2 July, one Turkish air force UH-60 aircraft departed from the illegal Tympou airport at 11.16 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace and international air traffic regulations, exited the Nicosia FIR at 11.38 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR.

On 4 July, one Turkish air force C-130 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 12.10 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, exited the FIR in a south-easterly direction, at 12.57 hours. On the same day, the aircraft illegally re-entered the Nicosia FIR at 15.42 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region and international air traffic regulations, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 16.29 hours.

On 5 July, one Turkish air force F-4 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 14.34 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region and international air traffic regulations, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 14.59 hours.

On 9 July, one Turkish air force C-130 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 09.18 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal Tympou airport at 09.34 hours. At 10.48 hours, the aircraft departed and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 11.05 hours.

On 16 July, the following violations occurred:

(a) Two Turkish air force F-16 aircraft, in one formation, illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 14.09 hours and, violating international air traffic regulations, exited en route to the Ankara FIR at 14.16 hours;

(b) One Turkish air force B-200 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.20 hours and, having violated Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal Tympou airport at 11.39 hours. At 15.09 hours, the aircraft departed and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR, at 15.23 hours;

(c) Two Turkish air force F-16 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 16.54 hours and 17.28 hours respectively and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, landed at the illegal Lefkoniko airport at 17.15 hours and 17.45 hours respectively. The aircraft departed at 19.35 hours and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace and international air traffic regulations, exited the Nicosia FIR in a formation at 19.55 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR.

On 17 July, the following violations occurred:

(a) Two Turkish air force F-16 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.12 hours and, having violated Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia, Ammohostos, Mesaoria and Kyrenia regions, exited the Nicosia FIR at 11.48 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR;

(b) Two Turkish air force F-4 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.20 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia, Ammohostos, Kyrenia and Mesaoria regions, exited the Nicosia FIR at 11.49 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR.

On 18 July, one Turkish air force C-160 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 12.13 hours and, after violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, exited the Nicosia FIR, in a south-easterly direction, at 13.00 hours. On the same day, at 16.20 hours, the aircraft illegally re-entered the Nicosia FIR and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 17.16 hours.

On 19 July, the following violations occurred:

(a) Nine Turkish air force NF-5 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR in four formations and, having violated Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Kyrenia and Karpasia regions, landed at the illegal Lefkoniko airport. Seven of the aircraft departed around noon, to carry out aero-acrobatics in different formations over the sea area of Kyrenia, and then landed once again at the illegal Lefkoniko airport;

(b) One Turkish air force C-160 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 07.52 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, landed at the illegal Lefkoniko airport at 08.12 hours. At 15.40 hours the aircraft departed and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR at 16.00 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR;

(c) One Turkish air force C-130 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 07.59 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, landed at the illegal Lefkoniko airport at 08.20 hours;

(d) One Turkish air force B-200 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 10.00 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal Tympou airport at 10.18 hours.

On 20 July, eight Turkish air force aircraft, four F-16 and four F-4 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.08 hours and 11.16 hours respectively and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Kyrenia-Mesaoria-Karpasia and Ammohostos regions, participated in the military parade over the Kionelli region and exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR, at 11.31, 11.33 and 11.35 hours respectively.

On 21 July, the following violations occurred:

(a) Nine Turkish air force NF-5 aircraft departed from the illegal Lefkoniko airport (where they had landed on 19 July) and, after performing aero-acrobatics in different formations over the Kyrenia region, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR;

(b) One Turkish air force B-200 aircraft departed from the illegal Tympou airport (where it had landed on 19 July) and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 11.23 hours;

(c) Two Turkish air force C-130 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.22 and 14.03 hours respectively and, having violated Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, landed at the illegal Lefkoniko airport. The aircraft later departed and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 14.39 and 16.35 hours respectively;

(d) One Turkish air force C-130 aircraft departed from the illegal Lefkoniko airport (where it had landed on 19 July) at 11.24 hours and, violating the Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR, at 11.40 hours;

(e) One Turkish air force aircraft of an unknown type was spotted within the Nicosia FIR, and after having flown over the Cypriot territorial waters, its track was lost in the Nicosia FIR.

On 1 August, one Turkish air force C-160 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 12.28 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region (Cape Apostolos Andreas), exited the FIR in a south-easterly direction, at 13.23 hours. On the same day, the aircraft illegally re-entered the Nicosia FIR at 16.33 hours and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR at 17.25 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR.

On 9 August, the following violations occurred:

(a) One Turkish air force F-4 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 10.07 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, exited the Nicosia FIR in a south-easterly direction at 10.31 hours;

(b) One Turkish air force C-130 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 08.54 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 14.54 hours.

On 16 August, two Turkish air force B-200 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 09.43 and 09.48 hours respectively and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal Tympou airport at 09.50 and 09.54 hours respectively. At 10.45 hours, one of the aircraft departed and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR at 11.01 hours, en route to the Ankara FIR.

On 18 August, one Turkish air force B-200 aircraft departed from the illegal Tympou airport at 10.05 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 10.22 hours.

On 28 August, two Turkish air force aircraft and one Agusta Bell and one Cougar aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 15.16 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal airport of Krini at 16.10 and 16.18 hours respectively.

On 29 August, one Turkish air force C-160 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 08.49 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, exited the FIR in a south-easterly direction at 09.36 hours. On the same day, the aircraft illegally re-entered the Nicosia FIR at 13.46 hours and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 14.31 hours.

On 5 September, one Turkish air force C-160 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 09.08 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, exited the Nicosia FIR in a south-easterly direction at 10.01 hours. On the same day, the aircraft re-entered the Nicosia FIR illegally at 13.37 hours and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 14.29 hours.

On 17 September, one Turkish B-200 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 09.48 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal Tympou airport at 10.10 hours. At 11.19 hours, the aircraft departed, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, en route to the Ankara FIR at 11.35 hours.

On 21 September, two Turkish air force F-16 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 10.45 hours in one formation and exited the Nicosia FIR at 10.51 hours in the direction of the Ankara FIR.

On 25 September, one Turkish air force C-130 aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.29 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Karpasia region, exited the Nicosia FIR at 12.13 hours in a south-easterly direction. On the same day, the aircraft re-entered the Nicosia FIR illegally at 14.54 hours and, once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the same region, exited the Nicosia FIR en route to the Ankara FIR at 15.40 hours.

On 26 September, one Turkish air force aircraft, of an unknown type, illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 11.36 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal Tympou airport at 12.11 hours. At 12.22 hours, the aircraft departed and landed at the illegal Krini airport.

On 28 September, one Turkish air force Gulfstream aircraft illegally entered the Nicosia FIR at 13.38 hours and, violating Cypriot sovereign airspace over the Mesaoria region, landed at the illegal Tympou airport at 13.54 hours. At 16.00 hours, the aircraft departed and once again violating Cypriot sovereign airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR at 16.13 hours.

As repeated in all our previous correspondence, these violations blatantly contravene international law and air traffic regulations and procedures and manifestly show Turkey's complete disrespect of all norms of international behaviour. Moreover, and more significantly, these violations seriously endanger civil aviation security.

I would like to note that these violations are taking place at a time when the international community expects the Turkish side to reverse its decision to decline your invitation to resume the process of negotiations and not to place preconditions in order to return to the negotiating table. It is noted that the Security Council, on 26 September 2001, expressed disappointment at this Turkish negative attitude, which it characterized as unjustified.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I strongly protest the above actions, which violate Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, and call for their cessation. The Government of Turkey should abide by the Charter of the United Nations and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and contribute towards a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem, on the basis of United Nations resolutions.

I shall be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sotos **Zackheos**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/973

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 16 October 2001 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council have considered your report dated 10 October on the United Nations Office in Angola (S/2001/956).

They concur with the recommendation contained in paragraph 62 of that report on the extension of the mandate of the Office until 15 April 2002 and are content with the objectives for the Office which you set in the report.

(*Signed*) Richard **Ryan**
President of the Security Council

01-58307 (E) 161001

United Nations S/2001/974

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 October 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 15 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that 179 unexploded cluster bombs, missiles, other ordnance and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines left behind by the 1991 30-nation aggression against Iraq were found and rendered harmless in all parts of Iraq in the period from 1 August to 30 September 2001. They were found in the following governorates: Baghdad, Basrah, Anbar, Ninawa, Salah al-Din, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Najaf and Wasit.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-58425 (E) 171001 171001

United Nations A/56/483–S/2001/975

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
17 October 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 17 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to an extremely grave act of terrorism that occurred this morning in Jerusalem.

At approximately 7 a.m. (local time) this morning, Israel's Minister of Tourism, Rehavam Ze'evi, was returning to his room in Jerusalem's Hyatt Hotel when Palestinian gunmen shot him twice in the head and in the neck. Ze'evi was rushed to Hadassah Hospital where he was pronounced dead three hours later. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attack.

The reprehensible murder of Minister Ze'evi is the latest incident in a continuing campaign of Palestinian terrorism that has been unrelenting for over a year. Previous attacks have been detailed in my letters dated 8 October 2001 (A/56/450-S/2001/948), 5 October 2001 (A/56/444-S/2001/943), 3 October 2001 (A/56/438-S/2001/938), 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-

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S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

The Government of Israel holds the Palestinian Authority responsible for the murder of Minister Ze'evi in the light of its central role in orchestrating and inciting an ongoing campaign of violence and terrorism directed against Israel and its citizens. This campaign — which has escalated from violent demonstrations to drive-by shootings to suicide bombings in public places, and now, to the assassination of an elected political figure — is a direct outgrowth of the collusion of the Palestinian leadership with recognized terrorist groups, its release of scores of their members from Palestinian prisons, its substantial contributions to an atmosphere of hatred of Jews and Israelis, and its abandonment of a viable political process. All of these actions represent grave and flagrant violations of signed commitments reached between Israel and the Palestinian leadership.

It should be noted that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which perpetrated this morning's murder, is headquartered in Damascus, maintains training facilities in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, and receives aid and logistical support from the Government of Syria.

It is outrageous that, at a time of renewed international commitment to combat terror and those that support it, certain regimes in the Middle East continue to support, and even participate in, violent terrorist operations. Israel calls on the international community, in the context of its global campaign against terrorism, to bring full pressure to bear and take decisive action against all States and entities that support terrorism or are actively engaged in terrorist operations.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as an official document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/976

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 October 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 10 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach herewith the assessment of the work of the Security Council for the month of September 2001 under the presidency of France for inclusion in the annex to the annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly.

This assessment has been prepared under my responsibility, following consultations with the members of the Council, in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 12 June 1997 (S/1997/451). It should not be considered as representing the views of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jean-David **Levitte**

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Annex to the letter dated 10 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]

Assessment of the French presidency of the Security Council (September 2001)

Summary

In view of the anticipated expiration dates and the announced visitors, the French presidency had set five objectives:

- To extend the mandate of two peacekeeping operations (the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE));
- To lift two sanctions regimes (against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Sudan);
- To conduct a dialogue with the facilitation teams of two African peace processes (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi);
- To meet high officials with regard to three countries on the Security Council's agenda (Angola, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina);
- To hold a high-level meeting on children in armed conflicts.

The first four objectives were fulfilled:

- The mandates of the two peacekeeping operations were extended by resolutions 1369 (2001) and 1370 (2001);
- The sanctions were lifted by resolutions 1367 (2001) and 1372 (2001);
- The Council met Sir Ketumile Masire, Facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and two members of the facilitation team for Burundi (Mr. Bomani and Mr. Haysom); this meeting made it possible to clarify the expectations of the facilitation team and the Council's response (which was formalized in a presidential statement);
- The Council held meetings with the Minister of the Interior of Angola; the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and head of the Kosovo Coordination Centre, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo; and the High Representative and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The fifth objective, together with the special session on children, had to be postponed in the wake of the tragic events of 11 September.

Other subjects, however, were dealt with during the month of September:

- Terrorism has obviously come to the forefront of the Council's agenda. The Council, in addition to a press statement on 11 September, adopted resolution 1368 (2001) as an immediate reaction to the terrorist attacks and resolution

1373 (2001) on 28 September 2001, whose purpose is much broader and deals with the financing of terrorism and cooperation between States to cut off support to terrorism. The Council thus gave an ambitious response to this challenge of unprecedented magnitude to the international community, thereby indicating the contribution the United Nations can make in this area;

- In this context also, Council members held two consultations on the situation in Afghanistan, particularly in view of the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation and very volatile military and political situation;

- The Council held a public meeting on the Central African Republic with the Representative of the Secretary-General to assess the peace-building efforts under way in that country and to mark the Council's ongoing interest in post-conflict situations. A presidential statement was adopted following this debate;

- The Council adopted resolution 1371 (2001), which gives political support to the efforts of various organizations and to the international security presence to be deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

- Finally, the Council considered the question of the Iraqi oil pricing mechanism, benefiting from the expertise of the oil overseers. Although divergent views on this issue have not been reconciled, the facts have been clearly presented.

With regard to procedure, the Council held two private meetings, two private meetings with troop-contributing countries, two private meetings open to non-members of the Council who wished to attend, three public meetings with the active participation of non-members of the Council (besides nine formal meetings to adopt texts) and fifteen consultations. The private meetings with troop-contributing countries were the first implementation of resolution 1353 (2001); they were warmly welcomed by those countries and gave them an opportunity to make their views known and to have a useful dialogue with the Council.

Details

Africa

Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE)

On Monday, 10 September, the Security Council held a private meeting with troop-contributing countries to UNMEE. It was the first implementation of resolution 1353 (2001), annex II.A, which provides that "the Security Council will hold public or private meetings with the participation of troop-contributing countries (...) and without prejudice to the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, in particular (...) when considering a change in, or renewal or completion of a peacekeeping mandate".

During the private meeting with troop-contributing countries and in informal consultations, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General gave a briefing on the current situation. The situation remained stable in the Temporary Security Zone; the parties, though not having formally accepted it, were respecting the Zone and cooperating with UNMEE. Internally displaced persons numbering 170,000 had returned home and 70,000 of them remained in camps. Demobilization had started (70,000 in Ethiopia). Nevertheless, several issues were outstanding: the status-of-

forces agreement had not yet been signed by one party; the freedom of movement of UNMEE was being restricted in the adjacent area north of the Temporary Security Zone; the number of police officers and militias present in the Zone had not been communicated to UNMEE; the Mission still could not fly directly between Addis Ababa and Asmara; comprehensive data on minefields were not yet available. Although confidence-building measures had started to be implemented, mistrust remained between the two parties (exchange of prisoners of war had stopped; citizens of the other countries continued to be expelled).

Council members expressed concern about the lack of progress in several areas. They emphasized two points, namely, how best to ensure that the parties live up to their commitments and cooperate fully with UNMEE, and what the exit strategy of UNMEE will be. On the first point, it was agreed that beyond the demands reiterated in the resolution extending the Mission, the President of the Council would meet with the representatives of the two countries concerned. A possible Security Council mission in the region at the beginning of next year was also considered. On the second point, Council members were of the view that a rapid completion of the work of the Boundary Commission would allow UNMEE to withdraw. In that regard, appropriate funding should be provided to the Commission.

The President of the Council spoke with the representatives of Ethiopia and Eritrea to convey the concern and dissatisfaction of Council members about the lack of progress on a series of issues. The two representatives restated the position of their respective Governments.

On 14 September 2001, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1369 (2001), which extends the mandate of UNMEE for six months.

Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

On Thursday, 13 September 2001, the Security Council held a private meeting with troop-contributing countries to UNAMSIL. It was the second implementation of resolution 1353 (2001).

During the private meeting with troop-contributing countries and in informal consultations, the Secretariat gave a briefing on the current situation. The decision of the Government of Sierra Leone to organize elections on 14 May 2002 had prompted the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to boycott an important meeting on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and to present several political demands, in particular the convening of a national consultative conference. The efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had convinced RUF to return to dialogue with the Government. Efforts had been made by the Government to address some of the political concerns expressed by RUF and some opposition parties. Nevertheless, RUF and the Civil Defence Forces had continued to disarm (almost 17,000 combatants since May 2001). The deployment of UNAMSIL had continued to make progress.

In the discussions, the following points were raised:

– What is the attitude of RUF? Is it willing to complete the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, relinquish its control over parts of the territory of Sierra Leone and transform itself into a genuine political party?

- The completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is the best guarantee not only for the creation of a secure environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, but also to the exit strategy of UNAMSIL. The programme may be put in jeopardy, however, for lack of resources (the trust fund of the World Bank will be short of cash in November). Contributions from donors are urgently needed. The whole peace process should not be disrupted because of insufficient funding;

- The preparation and holding of elections is a challenge both to the Government, which will have to strengthen its control over the territory and its security forces (the army, trained by the United Kingdom, and the police, trained by UNAMSIL), and to UNAMSIL, which will have to provide a secure environment, logistical support for elections and a credible monitoring mechanism;

- Diamond mines still controlled by RUF should be handed over to the Government to provide resources for reconstruction and development. Concerns were raised about ongoing forced labour;

- The importance of the regional dimension has been emphasized. The role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should be maintained and reinforced. Signs of some improvement in relations between the three countries of the Mano River Union are encouraging;

- Post-conflict peace-building will soon be necessary and will require commitment by international donors.

On 18 September, the Security Council adopted resolution 1370 (2001), which extends the mandate of UNAMSIL for six months.

Burundi

On 20 September 2001, Council members held consultations in the morning with the Secretariat (Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations) and with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Dinka, and met in closed session with two members of the facilitation team (Messrs. Bomani and Haysom) in the afternoon.

Council members stressed that keeping to the 1 November deadline for the installation of a transition government could have a positive impact on a number of outstanding issues, especially the issue of the ceasefire. There were two main problems to be resolved before the transition period: the establishment of a legal framework (including the adoption of two laws on provisional amnesty and on crimes of genocide) and the establishment of a special protection unit.

Regarding the latter, the purpose of the unit would be to ensure the safety of politicians returning from exile to participate in the transition institutions. No military function was planned. Members of the Council agreed that that was the responsibility of the Burundians. However, external assistance would be needed, inter alia to train, equip and finance the unit. The United Nations could provide technical assistance and help identify the lead nation — or, if necessary, the private firm — which could coordinate such foreign aid. The members of the facilitation team underscored the need for the Council to give political support to the establishment of such a protection unit which would help mobilize foreign aid. A

meeting of stakeholders (Burundian parties, countries of the region, potential donors, United Nations, European Union, the Organization of African Unity) should be organized in the near future in order to identify those who could assist in setting up the unit.

The ceasefire was also considered a key issue. Several Council members expressed regret that there had been no significant progress in negotiations with the two armed groups. They expressed support for the efforts made by the facilitation team in that regard. They pointed out that the peace process must remain inclusive in nature. The members of the facilitation team expressed the view that the installation of the transition government might encourage the armed groups to join the peace process because they would not want to be left out.

The Secretariat presented two scenarios for possible military involvement of the United Nations in the medium term: in the event of a rapid and dramatic deterioration of the situation with risks of genocide, only a coalition of volunteers could deploy a multinational force strong enough to protect civilians in a non-permissive environment. The United Nations could help identify the lead nation and potential troop contributors. In the event of a ceasefire, the United Nations could deploy a peacekeeping mission whose mandate would be to monitor the ceasefire, carry out a programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and, if necessary, restructure the armed forces.

The Council agreed on a presidential statement (S/PRST/2001/26) which was issued on 26 September.

Angola

On 20 September, the Security Council met in closed session with the Minister of the Interior of Angola. The Minister denounced recent attacks by the Uniaõ Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) on civilians, which had resulted in the deaths of more than 600 people. UNITA sought to obstruct the preparations for and the holding of elections the following year. The Minister expressed regret that, despite the sanctions, UNITA was still able to purchase arms. He welcomed the commitment of the countries of the Southern African Development Community to work together to implement the sanctions. He congratulated the Sanctions Committee and the oversight mechanism on their work and asked that the latter's mandate be extended for six months. He said that the Lusaka Protocol remained the only basis for a settlement of the conflict.

Members of the Council expressed their solidarity with the Government of Angola and condemned the UNITA attacks on civilians. Under the present circumstances sanctions remained a necessary tool to try to force UNITA to change its strategy. Members of the Council stressed that there was no military solution to the conflict. In that connection, they welcomed the news that the Government was planning to hold elections with the broadest possible popular participation, and the active involvement of civil society and churches in the peace process.

At the close of the meeting, the President read out a statement on the situation in Angola (S/PRST/2001/24).

Central African Republic

On 21 September 2001, the Security Council held an open meeting at which the Secretary-General's representative, Mr. Cissé, was present (see S/PV.4380). It agreed on a presidential statement, which was issued on 26 September 2001 (S/PRST/2001/25).

Sudan

On 28 September 2001, the Security Council adopted resolution 1372 (2001) whereby it lifted the sanctions imposed on the Sudan by resolutions 1054 (1996), 1070 (1996) and 1074 (1996).

Democratic Republic of the Congo

On 5 September 2001, the Security Council held a closed meeting with the Facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire; the meeting was open to non-members. The Facilitator and his colleagues reported to members of the Council on the preparatory meeting held in Gaborone and on the prospects for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. At the close of the meeting, the President read out a statement (S/PRST/2001/22).

Middle East

Iraq

Expulsion of staff of the Office of the Iraq Programme

During the consultations on 6 September 2001, the Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme informed members of the Council that Iraq had declared five United Nations staff members personae non gratae. The Government had given no explanation for its action, merely saying that the action was legitimate and that it would hold the United Nations responsible if those individuals did not leave Iraq immediately. The Executive Director of the Iraq Programme explained that he had decided to withdraw them out of concern for their physical safety and without prejudice to the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations or to their activities in accordance with the mandate of the humanitarian programme in Iraq. The Executive Director said that he had told the Iraqi authorities that, if any staff member acted in a manner that conflicted with the programme mandate or the Memorandum of Understanding, they should inform the Secretary-General and provide details of those actions so that the United Nations could take appropriate action. The Iraqi authorities had not done so in that instance.

Members of the Council expressed their support for the action taken by the Executive Director and said that any charges against United Nations staff should be substantiated. They agreed that the President of the Council should meet with the Permanent Representative of Iraq to request further clarifications and to communicate the Council's views; he duly did so. They also agreed that the President might speak to the press on their behalf (see press statement).

During the discussions, other issues concerning Iraq were raised (strikes in the no-fly zone, oil pricing mechanism). A variety of opinions were expressed but no conclusion was reached.

Oil pricing mechanism

During the consultations on 13 September, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990) reported to members of the Council on the issue of the official selling price for Iraqi oil for the month of September. No agreement had been reached, for some delegations had wanted to accept the official selling price proposed by the oil overseers for the United States market for the entire month of September while others had been prepared to accept it only for the first half of the month. As there had been no consensus in the Committee on the price for the United States market, the Chairman had decided to seek the Council's opinion on the matter. The discussion that followed made it clear that there were different views on the subject: some delegations felt that the consensus rule under which all sanctions committees worked had been violated; others stressed the need to shorten the pricing period so as to prevent a situation in which, with the market price well above the official selling price, excess profits were generated which might be returned to Iraq in the form of fees outside the escrow account and of the 986 programme.

During the consultations on 24 September, the oil overseers informed members of the Council of the current situation concerning the oil pricing mechanism. They noted that a premium of 5 cents per barrel was the most that contractors could reasonably obtain. They pointed out that since December 2000, the premium had rarely fallen below 30 cents per barrel and that Iraq had almost never asked for the official selling price to be adjusted when the market price was rising. Members of the Council wondered whether the excess premium could be channelled back to Iraq. In any event, it meant a loss of earnings for the oil-for-food programme. Several members of the Council were of the opinion that one way to try to reduce the excess premium would be to shorten the pricing period. Others felt that that might destabilize the entire system of Iraqi oil exports. Council members were unable to reach consensus on such a measure.

Council members also discussed the issue of the procedure followed by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990), in particular, the role of consensus.

The President concluded that there was agreement on having a weekly report from the oil overseers on the state of the oil market and that all delegations should be flexible so as to resolve all contentious issues within the Committee, including the pricing mechanism.

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)

During the consultations on 18 September, Mr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, submitted his quarterly report (S/2001/833) of 30 August 2001. In view of the circumstances, he drew a parallel between the terrorist threat and the dangers stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which might be used by State or non-State agents. The international community should focus on combating chemical and biological proliferation; the experience acquired

by the Special Commission, UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be useful in that regard. He commented on various aspects of his report, including on the lack of cooperation from Iraq, without which it was impossible to verify Iraq's unilateral declaration that it had fulfilled all its obligations. He outlined the work done by the College of Commissioners to define the key concepts of resolution 1284 (1999) concerning disarmament.

Members of the Council welcomed the preparatory work done by UNMOVIC. Some members echoed the opinion expressed by Mr. Blix concerning the need to strengthen efforts to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the present context. Some members wondered whether Iraq had rebuilt some of its capacities to develop such weapons since December 1998. Mr. Blix said that, in the absence of on-site inspections, UNMOVIC was using three sources of information: satellites, open sources and information supplied by Member States.

Council members emphasized that Iraq must implement all relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1284 (1999); that was the only way to move towards the suspension and subsequent lifting of sanctions. Some members noted that one of the reasons for the current deadlock was that the Security Council was insisting that UNMOVIC must verify that Iraq had complied with its obligations, whereas Iraq stated that it had already done so. Some members wondered how to re-engage Iraq and expressed regret that it had not been possible to pursue the dialogue which the Secretary-General had initiated in February. Finally, some members were in favour of an overall approach in order to break the current deadlock on Iraq.

Palestine

Members of the Council agreed on a reply to the letter dated 19 July 2001 from the Secretary-General, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 55/55 under the heading "Question of Palestine".

Asia

Afghanistan

At the consultations on 18 September 2001, the Secretariat briefed Council members on recent developments concerning Afghanistan. Details were given on the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud. Following the assassination, military operations were initiated by the two parties with no significant change in the front line. The humanitarian situation remains disastrous and will continue to deteriorate. Between 5.5 and 6 million Afghans are at risk and dependent on international assistance. The United Nations evacuated its remaining 75 staff members as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Contingency plans were made, in particular as regards assistance in the form of food and shelter. In the absence of international staff, the local staff may be overwhelmed. The Secretariat recalled that so far the Taliban have refused to implement the Security Council resolutions and that the outlook was uncertain, since the regime had recently hardened its stance.

Council members unanimously stated that the Taliban must implement the resolutions. That regime bore the brunt of responsibility for the disastrous

humanitarian situation, which was a source of great concern to the Council and to the entire international community. It was agreed that, given the circumstances, consideration of a global approach to the Afghan problem should be postponed. Council members also agreed to issue a short and strongly worded message to the Taliban: implement the resolutions of the Security Council, and in particular resolution 1333 (2000), immediately and unconditionally (see press statement).

At the consultations on 27 September 2001, the Secretariat briefed Council members on recent developments:

- Fighting has apparently occurred in various northern provinces. The Northern Alliance has launched offensives. There are signs of Taliban military reinforcement but non-Afghan fighters seem to have disappeared on the Takhan front;

- The humanitarian situation has further deteriorated. Five million people need international assistance. The local staff of humanitarian agencies are remaining in Afghanistan but their activity is severely hampered. Depots and equipment of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have been seized by the Taliban. The number of people at risk could reach 7.5 million and the number of displaced persons 2.5 million. The actions of all the competent agencies are coordinated at the regional level. The frontiers of Afghanistan with Iran and Pakistan should be reopened so that Afghans fleeing their country can find temporary refuge. There is an urgent need for response to the Secretary-General's appeal for donations in the amount of US$ 584 million;

- The Secretary-General's Special Envoy participated in a meeting of the Geneva initiative and met former King Zahir.

Council members expressed distress and concern about the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation and the behaviour of the Taliban towards international humanitarian workers. They echoed the Secretary-General's appeal for immediate international assistance for the refugees, the host countries and, to the extent possible, the needy in Afghanistan. The international community must be prepared to face a humanitarian disaster of grave proportions.

At the political level, it is urgently necessary to bring together the various Afghan factions and the 6+2 countries in order to find viable ways of achieving the long-awaited comprehensive political settlement.

At the end of the consultations, the President conveyed Council members' views to the press (see press statement).

East Timor

The Security Council held an open meeting on 10 September on the situation in East Timor following the elections of 30 August (see S/PV.4367). At the end of the meeting, the President read out a statement on the situation in East Timor (S/PRST/2001/23).

Europe

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Security Council held an open meeting on 21 September on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the High Representative, Mr. Petritsch, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Klein (see S/PV.4379).

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

1. On 10 September 2001, the Security Council adopted resolution 1367 (2001), lifting the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia imposed by resolution 1160 (1998).

2. On 17 September, the Security Council held a closed meeting open to non-members with the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Mr. Covic, who is also the head of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Haekkerup. Mr. Covic expressed concern about the continuing violence in Kosovo, the very small number of displaced persons returning to Kosovo and the certification of extremist parties. He appealed for cooperation between UNMIK and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, along the lines of the cooperation developed between KFOR and the Yugoslav authorities in the Ground Safety Zone.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

On 26 September 2001, the Security Council adopted resolution 1371 (2001) on The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Cyprus

At the consultations on 26 September, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus briefed Council members on the latest developments. On behalf of the Secretary-General, the Special Adviser had extended an invitation to the two Cypriot sides to resume the search for a comprehensive settlement and to hold separate meetings in New York in September. The head of the Turkish Cypriot community had not accepted the invitation on the grounds that it was necessary to prepare a common basis for the negotiations as such and that the subject of the talks should be the creation of a new partnership based on equal status. The Special Adviser was of the opinion that the principles set out in resolution 1250 (1999) remained valid and that the door was still open. He hoped that the parties would remain involved.

Council members regretted the lack of progress and the attitude of the Turkish side. They expressed the hope that the situation would soon change. They agreed on a press statement, which was read out by the Council President on behalf of the Council members (see press statement).

Terrorism

Council members reacted immediately to the tragic events of 11 September by issuing a press statement (see press statement).

On the following day, they adopted resolution 1368 (2001).

On 28 September, they adopted resolution 1373 (2001).

Peacekeeping

On 25 September, Council members endorsed the report of the working group on peacekeeping concerning "No exit without strategy", which was issued as a note by the President of the Security Council (S/2001/905).

Annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly

The annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly was adopted at an open meeting on 18 September 2001.

Council members agreed to ask the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Matters to consider the structure and content of the report and to submit proposals on how it could be made more useful and less costly.

Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Matters

Although it had been specified during the Council's 4375th meeting, on 18 September 2001, that a meeting of the Working Group would be held a few days later to consider ways of improving the annual report of the Security Council, the meeting could not be held because of scheduling problems.

Appendix

Press statements

Iraq
6 September

Members of the Security Council have heard a briefing by the Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme on the decision of Iraq to declare personae non gratae five members of that Office.

Members of the Security Council support the decision taken by the Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme to withdraw those colleagues for their own safety.

Members of the Security Council concur with the legal points forwarded by the Executive Director and urge Iraq to give further explanations regarding this decision. In this connection, I will be in touch with the Permanent Representative of Iraq soon.

Members of the Security Council take this opportunity to reaffirm their full support for the Office of the Iraq Programme and in particular for its personnel on the ground who carry out their task under difficult conditions.

Afghanistan
18 September

Members of the Security Council heard a full briefing by Under-Secretary-General Prendergast on the political, military and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, including the dire consequences of Taliban rule for the Afghan people.

There is one and only one message the Security Council has for the Taliban: implement United Nations Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1333 (2000), immediately and unconditionally.

27 September

Members of the Council held this morning a very important meeting with a briefing by the Secretary-General on different aspects of the crisis in and around Afghanistan. They were also briefed on the situation by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Danilo Turk, and by the Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ms. Carolyn McAskie.

Members of the Security Council expressed deep concern at the worsening humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan in the last 10 days. The tragedy of the Afghan people has deep roots, more than two decades of conflict and three years of drought, but the fast deteriorating situation today was basically the result of decisions taken by the Taliban.

Members of the Council stated that the international community stood ready and determined to respond urgently and generously to the repeated calls by the Secretary-General and United Nations agencies for assistance for the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries. They stressed the need for humanitarian assistance efforts to be closely coordinated.

Members of the Council called on the Taliban to remove all restrictions on the supply of desperately needed humanitarian aid, including those on food supplies and humanitarian relief workers. These restrictions have one result: the humanitarian assistance cannot be provided inside the country. The Taliban will be held responsible for the consequences of their own decisions.

Members of the Council recognized the particular pressures of potential refugee flows on Afghanistan's neighbours, in particular Pakistan and Iran. Specific assistance to those countries was needed.

Members of the Council also discussed the political situation. They reaffirmed relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). In this regard, they welcomed the recent commitment by States, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and especially Pakistan.

In light of this critical situation, members of the Council expressed their intention to review regularly the situation in Afghanistan.

Terrorism
11 September

Members of the Security Council are shocked by and unanimously condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which have taken place today in New York, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere in the United States. There can be no excuse or justification for these acts.

Members of the Security Council express their deepest sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families and to the people and Government of the United States of America.

Members of the Security Council call on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of today's outrages. They call on the international community to redouble its efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts by increased cooperation and full implementation of relevant international anti-terrorist conventions.

Members of the Security Council express their readiness to take urgent further steps in accordance with their responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.

Cyprus
26 September

Council members heard a briefing from Mr. Alvaro de Soto, the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Cyprus, on 26 September. They commended the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser for their efforts and the initiatives they have taken since November 1999 to move the process forward, including an invitation to the leaders to resume the search for a comprehensive settlement in New York this month.

Council members expressed disappointment at the unjustified decision by the Turkish side to decline that invitation. Progress can only be made at the negotiating table.

Council members encourage the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser to continue their efforts using the guidelines in resolution 1250 (1999), namely that there should be no preconditions; that all issues are on the table; that both sides should make a commitment in good faith to negotiate until a settlement is reached; and that there should be a full consideration of relevant United Nations resolutions and treaties.

Council members gave full support to the Secretary-General's efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem. They urge all concerned to cooperate with the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser and to show confidence in their judgement as to the best way to move forward.

United Nations S/2001/977

Security Council

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18 October 2001
English
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Letter dated 15 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention the statement issued on 9 October 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union concerning the Middle East peace process (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jean **de Ruyt**
Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations

01-58686 (E) 221001 221001

Annex to the letter dated 15 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Statement issued on 9 October 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union, on behalf of the European Union, concerning the Middle East peace process

The European Union expresses its deep concern at the further worsening of the situation in the Middle East. It deplores the considerable increase in the number of victims resulting from the confrontations, terror, provocation and violence. It unreservedly voices its support for the Peres-Arafat dialogue, which must lead to a lasting political situation.

It appeals to the parties to implement in good faith the commitments they have entered into in the context of the ceasefire, and to open the direct dialogue which should be begun further to the Mitchell report's recommendations and to aim for urgent opening-up of a political perspective.

In this respect, the European Union calls on the parties to agree on an impartial surveillance mechanism which can help them to overcome their differences and the obstacles they are encountering in their efforts to achieve reconciliation. The European Union remains ready to contribute to such a mechanism.

The European Union moreover welcomes President Bush's declaration acknowledging the right of the Palestinians to a viable State provided that Israel's right to exist is guaranteed. This has long been the European Union's position.

To this end, the European Union emphasizes the full importance of an enhanced dialogue between the European Union and the United States. The European Union urges the United States to exert all its influence with a view to a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

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Security Council

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18 October 2001
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Letter dated 15 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention the statement issued on 9 October 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union concerning the Western Balkans (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jean **De Ruyt**
Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations

01-58692 (E) 191001 191001

Annex to the letter dated 15 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Statement issued on 9 October 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union concerning the Western Balkans

The events of 11 September and their developments have reinforced more than ever the need for the countries of the region to resolve, by democratic means, all matters still outstanding. This will enable the Union to accelerate further the region's stabilization and integration within the European structures.

The Council expressed its concern about the insufficient progress made by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in implementing the 13 August 2001 Framework Agreement. The Council stressed that the full and faithful implementation of the Framework Agreement by all the parties concerned remains the only guarantee of a return to peace and stability in the country, as well as national reconciliation between all the communities, respecting the territorial integrity and unity of the country. Unless the Framework Agreement is implemented, the process of rapprochement of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the European Union will be compromised. The Council therefore expects all democratic forces in the country to continue to engage fully and constructively in this parliamentary process. It appeals to the Parliament to approve all the constitutional and legislative provisions of the Framework Agreement, as agreed by the parties, at the earliest opportunity, thus paving the way for its full implementation. Moreover, the Council is waiting for the Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to swiftly take the necessary measures to find an effective solution to the problem of an amnesty for the rebels and for the process of the return of the security forces to be coordinated with the representatives of the international community.

The Council repeated that the European Union remains determined to play an active role in the implementation of the Agreement. It took note in this regard of the Commission proposal to extend the geographical sphere of competence of the European Agency for Reconstruction to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and agreed to determine its position on the proposal rapidly. It stressed, however, that its assistance in the reforms being carried out by the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is conditional upon the satisfactory conclusion of the parliamentary process of constitutional revision. In this context, the Council notes that the conditions for convening a donors' conference have not yet been fulfilled.

The Council appreciated the vigorous support given by the United Nations Security Council for the establishment, at the request of the Government in Skopje, of a multinational security presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Council welcomed the North Atlantic Council's decision to authorize the deployment of the Operation Amber Fox force to provide that presence and contribute to the security of the international monitors deployed by the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union whose number will also be increased.

The Council also welcomed the excellent work carried out by François Léotard, the European Union's Special Representative, under the authority of Javier Solana, High Representative, in the conclusion of the Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001, working in close collaboration with James Pardew, the Special Envoy of the President of the United States. It also praised François Léotard's role in coordinating the implementation of the Agreement on the ground.

The Council confirmed the importance which the European Union attaches to a massive turnout for the poll on 17 November 2001 on the part of all communities in Kosovo, to ensure that they are appropriately and effectively represented in the new democratically elected institutions. That will enable the communities of Kosovo to work together in creating a stable, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo. With that in mind the Council welcomed the registration of an encouraging number of Serbian electors in Kosovo in recent weeks. The Council encouraged the Belgrade authorities to maintain their cooperative attitude, in particular by officially stating their support for the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the ballot and stepping up their cooperation with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the International Security Force in Kosovo.

The Council again stressed the importance of full implementation of the Covic plan for Southern Serbia, including the introduction of confidence-building measures.

Recalling its previous conclusions, particularly those of 22 January 2001, the Council stressed the importance of a constructive and substantive dialogue, in a general federal context, between the Belgrade and Podgorica authorities, to decide on new constitutional arrangements for relations between the components of the Federation that are acceptable to all parties. That would also promote beneficial participation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Stabilization and Association Process.

The Council welcomed the holding of the second regional conference of the Stability Pact in Bucharest on 25 and 26 October 2001, from which it expects a positive political signal regarding the countries of South-East Europe in favour of continuing reform and regional cooperation.

The Council expressed satisfaction at the participation for the first time of the five Western Balkan countries in the forthcoming European Conference on combating terrorism to be held in Brussels on 20 October 2001.

In accordance with its conclusions of 11 June 2001, the Council confirmed (without debate) the terms of reference of the EU-Albania Consultative Task Force and welcomed the fact that its inaugural meeting is to be held shortly.

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Letter dated 15 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw to your attention the statement issued on 9 October 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union concerning the Great Lakes region (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jean **de Ruyt**
Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations

01-58699 (E) 221001 221001

Annex to the letter dated 15 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Statement issued on 9 October 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union concerning the Great Lakes region

Great Lakes region

Following adoption of the common position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and its conclusions of 14 May 2001, the Council noted the avenues traced by the Presidency for future work and examined in Council bodies with a view to establishing a policy towards the Great Lakes region which would, in particular, better coordinate the instruments available to the Union and lead to greater coherence in its actions. This is a long-term exercise, requiring short and medium-term actions, but whose success will principally depend on the desire for peace shown by the parties to the peace processes.

The Council welcomed the encouraging developments in the two peace processes over the past two months.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (Lusaka Process). The successful Gaborone meeting led by the facilitator, Mr. Masire, at the end of August opens up the way for the inter-Congolese dialogue which will begin as of 15 October in Addis Ababa and which the Union hopes will lead to an inclusive and democratic transition. This is a political exercise essential for the future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the stability of the region. The problem of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants belonging to the "negative forces" has been the subject of various initiatives from Kinshasa and Kigali. The Council urges the responsible international organizations (United Nations, inter alia, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank) to promptly pursue the preparation of necessary DDR programmes. The Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement noted in mid-September the signatory States' intention to withdraw foreign troops and a call for continued deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The Council underlines the urgent need for the signatory States and other parties to the Lusaka Agreement to demonstrate the political will required to end support for the negative forces, and will use its influence to continue the deployment of MONUC in the framework of its existing mandate.

Burundi (Arusha Process). Similarly, the agreement reached at the end of July on guiding the transition in Burundi led by the facilitator, Mr. Mandela, also opens up new prospects, although these are still fragile in the absence of a ceasefire.

In both cases, the European Union, in close consultation with the United Nations, but also with the Organization of African Unity and the other international parties involved, must confirm its political and financial support for the two peace processes that are under way. It is in this light that the Council has agreed on certain actions in support of the peace processes and has welcomed the forthcoming mission

to the region of a ministerial troika led by the President of the Council. The main aims of this ministerial mission will be to confirm the Union's commitment, to exploit the continuing end-of-crisis dynamic by examining together with the parties concerned, the progress needed in the near future and to inform them about the short-term support actions that the Union envisages in this context.

United Nations S/2001/980

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 October 2001
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Original: French

Letter dated 17 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to the following document issued on 17 October 2001 (see annex):

Council conclusions of 17 October 2001 Action by the European Union following the attacks in the United States of America

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jean **De Ruyt**
Permanent Representative

01-58964 (E) 191001 191001

Annex to the letter dated 17 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Council conclusions of 17 October 2001

Action by the European Union following the attacks in the United States of America

1. The European Union declares its total solidarity with the United States, with which it shares the objectives of combating terrorism. It reiterates the importance of its close consultations with the United States. It confirms its wholehearted support for the action taken in the context of legitimate defence and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolution 1368 (2001).

2. The General Affairs Council has reiterated the importance of a multilateral and global approach under the aegis of the United Nations in order to strengthen the international coalition in its fight against terrorism in all its aspects. The European Union will act with determination within the United Nations and the other competent international organizations to further the fight against terrorism. It will take advantage, in particular, of the ministerial session of the General Assembly to be held in November to advance its objectives.

3. Emergency humanitarian aid in Afghanistan is an absolute priority of the European Union, which undertakes to mobilize without delay aid amounting to more than 320 million euros (EUR). In this respect, the releasing of EUR 25 million from the reserve will enable the Commission (ECHO) to respond to the most urgent humanitarian needs. Mobilization and convoying of aid will be regularly examined.

4. The General Affairs Council expresses its concern at the difficulties of access and of convoying humanitarian aid in Afghanistan. It supports the efforts of the United Nations specialized agencies, of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of all humanitarian organizations to seek practical and flexible solutions. The Council also appeals to the countries of the region to facilitate by all means possible the humanitarian operations for hosting fresh flows of Afghan refugees and will implement the necessary means to assist them in doing so.

5. The General Affairs Council has agreed on the following points to guide the Union's future proceedings on Afghanistan, once it is freed of the al Qa'ida network and of its terrorists:

- The establishment in Afghanistan of a stable, legitimate and broadly representative government, expressing the will of the people;
- The essential role of the United Nations in seeking a peace plan for Afghanistan;
- Maintaining absolute priority for emergency humanitarian aid;
- A plan for the reconstruction of the country;
- The regional dimension of the stabilization of Afghanistan.

It instructs the Presidency, the High Representative and the Commission to make contact without delay with the international community, in particular the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his personal representative, Mr. Brahimi, in order to contribute effectively to United Nations efforts.

6. The General Affairs Council has decided to intensify the relations of the European Union with the countries neighbouring Afghanistan in order to contribute to the stability of the region. The political dialogue with Pakistan, whose efforts in the current situation are deserving of praise, will be stepped up. The signing of a cooperation agreement with Pakistan will be envisaged. The Council notes the proposals made by the Commission regarding trade and welcomes its intention to provide financial assistance, in coordination with international financial institutions.

7. The President of the General Affairs Council informed the Indian Government on 15 October 2001 of the European Union's intention to define, with a view to the European Union/India Summit to be held on 23 November 2001, intensification of the political dialogue and cooperation with that country.

8. While continuing the political dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the General Affairs Council welcomes the Commission's undertaking to submit in November 2001 negotiating directives for a trade and cooperation agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

9. Relations with the countries of Central Asia will be developed more actively. The General Affairs Council noted the Commission's intention of submitting at the earliest opportunity a communication on Central Asia, including concrete initiatives in the context of strengthening the relations of the European Union with these countries. The Council also invited the High Representative to make proposals.

10. Further to the ministerial Troika mission held at the end of September 2001, the European Union is determined to continue a close and coordinated political dialogue with our Arab and Muslim partners, and invites the Presidency and the High Representative to keep the General Affairs Council informed.

11. The European Union emphasizes the urgent need to relaunch the Middle East peace process. Recalling its declaration of 8 October 2001, the General Affairs Council invited the High representative to continue, with the United States and the principal players, his efforts to bring the parties to the conflicts in the Middle East to work towards a political settlement, based on the principle of the establishment of a Palestinian state and the right of Israel to live in peace and security.

12. The member States will consult each other on the measures they take, in particular in order to ensure the effectiveness of ministerial visits in the region.

13. Furthermore, the European Union will be more effective in developing the Common Foreign Security Policy and making the European Security and Defence Policy operational as soon as possible.

14. The General Affairs Council examined the Presidency's report on the work done by the various configurations of the General Affairs Council on the fight against terrorism.

15. It welcomes the fact that, in all the configurations of the General Affairs Council, work on stepping up the fight against terrorism is progressing satisfactorily and has already produced its initial results. The conclusions of the extraordinary

informal European Council of 21 September 2001 have everywhere produced effects. It noted in particular the following results:

- The measures which have already been taken, in particular pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), against the sources that fund terrorism, such as the political agreement on the directive against money-laundering, application in full of the Financial Action Task Force measures and freezing the assets of persons and organizations linked to the Taliban;

- Work in progress to draw up a list of terrorist organizations and the valuable contribution made by the intelligence services; the Council believes that their regular meetings are vital if terrorism is to be combated successfully; the Council approved a system of indicators making it possible to evaluate the commitment and the cooperation of third countries in the fight against terrorism;

- The progress already made in the examination of Commission proposals on the European arrest warrant and terrorist offences and the establishment of a coordinated European Union position in the context of the conclusion of a global United Nations convention on international terrorism; the Council requests that at the same time consideration should be given to any measure facilitating mutual assistance with third countries concerning the pursuit of terrorists or terrorist organizations;

- The many current contacts with the United States of America, in particular the Troika's meeting at operational level planned for 19 October 2001 in Washington, D.C., which will include representatives from the Police Task Force, EUROPOL's anti-terrorism group, EUROJUST and the intelligence services.

16. The General Affairs Council welcomed the road map submitted by the Presidency, which sets out all the initiatives and work carried out by the Council and lists those responsible for implementation, the time frames and progress made. The Council asked for the road map to be regularly updated by "Coreper". It considers this to be an essential instrument for measuring the results obtained in all configurations of the Council. It is on the basis of the updated road map that at its next meeting the Council will examine further progress.

17. The General Affairs Council instructed the Permanent Representatives Committee to ensure that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), the European Union reports back on the measures it has taken to implement that resolution.

United Nations S/2001/981

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 12 October 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I wish to inform you that the current mandate of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) comes to an end on 31 December 2001.

In spite of the difficult political and security circumstances prevailing in the country and the subregion and the limited resources available to it, the Office continues to make worthwhile contributions in the areas of national reconciliation, respect for human rights and the rule of law through good offices and training programmes. It has kept me and the Security Council informed of the evolving situation in the country and provided a useful political link between Liberia and the international community, particularly since the imposition of sanctions. It has also given support to the various phases of the Sierra Leone peace process.

In the light of the above and following consultations with the Government of Liberia, I recommend that the mandate of UNOL be extended for one additional year, to 31 December 2002. It is my intention to conduct a thorough review of the UNOL mandate during 2002 and then to make the appropriate proposals to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-58820 (E) 181001

United Nations S/2001/982

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 18 October 2001 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 October 2001 (S/2001/981) concerning your recommendation that the current mandate of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia, which expires on 31 December 2001, be extended until 31 December 2002, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the recommendation contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Richard **Ryan**
President of the Security Council

01-58814 (E) 181001

United Nations S/2001/983

Security Council

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18 October 2001

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

For the period from 25 July to 15 October 2001

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1338 (2001) of 31 January 2001, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) until 31 January 2002. In that resolution, the Council stressed the need for a substantial international presence in East Timor after independence and requested me to make detailed recommendations in this regard, in close consultation with the East Timorese people and in coordination with other relevant international and bilateral actors.

2. The present report describes developments in East Timor since my report of 24 July 2001 (S/2001/719) and progress made in planning for an international presence in East Timor after independence. During this period, the Council received a public briefing on 30 July (see S/PV.4351), a private briefing on the preparations for the elections on 23 August and a public briefing on 10 September on the successful conduct of the elections for the Constituent Assembly (see S/PV.4367).

3. The report is divided into three parts, the first of which contains an assessment of the progress made in the implementation of core elements of the UNTAET mandate. The second part of the present report provides an update on efforts to support economic and social development in East Timor. The third part outlines the proposed structure for the successor mission to UNTAET in East Timor after independence, as well as the resources required to complete the Security Council mandate provided under resolutions 1272 (1999) and 1338 (2001).

II. Transition to independence

A. Political developments

4. Since my report of 24 July, three crucial steps have been taken in continuing the progress towards independence for East Timor: the election of a Constituent Assembly; the start of the 90-day Constitution-drafting process; and the formation of an all-East Timorese Council of Ministers.

5. After the peaceful elections for the Constituent Assembly on 30 August, in which 91.3 per cent of eligible voters participated, the Independent Electoral Commission announced the final certified results on 10 September, and assessed that the criteria for a free and fair election had been met. On 15 September, my Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, swore in the 88 members of the Constituent Assembly.

6. Following the drafting and adoption of its rules and procedures on 8 October, the Assembly established a Committee to make recommendations on the Constitution and to oversee its drafting. They have before them the reports of the 13 Constitutional Commissions, which summarize the views expressed by over 36,000 Timorese. The topics addressed include national and territorial sovereignty; the country name and flag; systems of government, including presidential and semi-presidential, centralized and decentralized

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systems; economy, taxation and investment; language and citizenship. Members of the Assembly completed a three-day training course with the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the first in a series of training sessions on procedural issues, legislative work practices and comparative international constitutional experience.

7. On 20 September, my Special Representative appointed the "Second Transitional Government". The appointment of its 20 ministers, vice-ministers and secretaries of state, all Timorese, broadly reflects the outcome of the elections of 30 August, as well as sectoral expertise, with an emphasis on youth and geographical representation. A Council of Ministers, led by a Chief Minister, Mari Alkatiri, presides over the Transitional Government and supervises the East Timor Public Administration. This is the first time that executive government in East Timor is controlled by East Timorese, albeit under the overall authority of my Special Representative.

8. Strong regional relationships will clearly play a key role in ensuring the long-term stability and development of East Timor. In a welcome development, the President of Indonesia, Megawati Soekarnoputri, invited my Special Representative, accompanied by Mari Alkatiri, Chief Minister, and José Ramos-Horta, Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs, together with Xanana Gusmão, to Jakarta for meetings on 12 September. The discussions focused on the need to resolve outstanding matters, including border issues, pensions, land transit between the Oecussi enclave and East Timor, cultural cooperation and scholarships.

B. Establishment of a functioning public administration

Civil administration

9. The establishment of an effective, functioning government administration was fundamental to the comprehensive mandate given to UNTAET under Security Council resolution 1272 (1999), and is crucial to fostering a stable and secure social, economic and political environment.

10. In addition to the historic political developments outlined above, major advances have been made in the past two years in building a civil service and its institutions from the ground up. By mid-September 2001, UNTAET had recruited some 9,500 East Timorese civil servants, about 90 per cent of the revised target of 10,500. The number of women recruited increased to over 2,400 employees, or 25 per cent of the total staff. Over the past few months, the Civil Service Academy of the East Timor Public Administration has conducted seminars, workshops and courses in public management and governance, as well as training to help develop computer and language skills. In cooperation with the Office of District Administration, the Academy has now trained more than 3,400 East Timorese district civil servants. The Civil Service Academy is also regularly used as a venue for donor training programmes for East Timorese administrators.

11. While recruitment and training are progressing, however, the civil administration of East Timor continues to be highly reliant on international staff in both advisory and line positions, and on services provided by UNTAET. Much remains to be done to transform the bureaucracy into a viable, sustainable national administration run by East Timorese civil servants, with strong policy, regulatory and operational frameworks.

12. The professional bureaucratic skills and capacity of many civil servants remain limited, particularly in the areas of senior management and in highly technical and professional areas of government administration. Of particular concern are the areas of public finances, the judiciary, senior management and the development and maintenance of the central administrative systems of government.

13. Furthermore, maintaining the delivery of government services while diminishing their dependence on UNTAET support will require careful management of expectations and difficult decision-making to ensure that realistic and sustainable standards of service are set prior to independence. Realistically, it is unlikely that the current level of services could be sustained by an independent government on current revenue estimates. The necessary lowering of government service standards to ensure the sustainability of development in East Timor is likely to be a source of friction.

Public finances

14. East Timor's public finances will require particularly careful management during the fiscal year 2001-2002 to respond to current and potential future problems. Substantial pressures on the current national

budget have arisen from the restructuring of the administration and the costs of the transition to independence. Furthermore, post-independence revenues, including service taxes and import duties, are likely to be negatively affected by the downsizing of UNTAET in 2002.

15. The public expenditure level set under the national budget must ensure that the social and economic sectors are adequately financed, taking into account the absorptive and fiscal capacity of the economy over the medium term. The complexity of managing East Timor's public finances is compounded by the need to obtain donor support for the two primary trust funds (the first funds the national budget, and the second supports capital investment and recovery), while coordinating other bilateral and multilateral development assistance. Even with projected oil and gas revenues, East Timor will need to continue to manage its scarce resources carefully. As foreshadowed at the donors meeting in Canberra in June 2001, significant budgetary support will be needed for the recurrent budget in subsequent years. Donor funds are still being sought to meet the financing gap of $20 million this year.

16. The management of public finances will require a minimum level of international technical support in the period following independence, in order to build upon the progress that has already been achieved. Without such support, the risk of mismanagement of public finances could threaten the overall functioning of the administration, as well as donor confidence in East Timor.

Justice

17. The Office of the Deputy Prosecutor for Ordinary Crimes continues to direct investigations into more than 400 criminal cases for offences committed since November 1999. From 1 August to 31 September, District Courts delivered sentences in 28 trials.

18. Traditional justice is an integral part of East Timor's authority system that regulates the daily lives of the majority of the country's population. In September 2001 a workshop was initiated on traditional justice, highlighting the need to identify a manner in which customary law can be used to complement the formal justice system.

19. Training for prison service staff is continuing, with all staff receiving training in emergency and standard policies and procedures. Recruitment for additional prison officers continues. In September, the Human Rights Unit launched a training programme on human rights for East Timorese prison officers in both the Gleno and Becora prisons. The training sessions highlight United Nations standards for the treatment of detainees and prisoners, as well as the newly *promulgated UNTAET regulation 2001/27 on the* establishment of a prison service in East Timor.

20. The justice system is still in a nascent state, however, and will need continued close attention. There are only 25 East Timorese judges and 13 prosecutors, the majority of whom have had only secondary education and less than two years of training and experience. On occasion, inappropriate sentences have been handed down, leading to retrials. Cases of intimidation during trials have occurred, in one instance resulting in the extended closure of the Baucau courthouse. The lack of resources, including interpreters, has led to delayed hearings and unduly prolonged detention of suspects.

21. In order to make the court system more effective and expedite the judicial process, regulation 2001/25 was promulgated on 14 September 2001. This regulation introduced several new measures, including the nomination of Judge Administrators for each of the District Courts, the possibility for certain cases now to be tried by a single judge and the granting of more Court supervisory powers to the President of the East Timor Court of Appeal.

22. It is clear, however, that the justice system of East Timor will continue to require significant international support, particularly judicial expertise, beyond independence. Any precipitous withdrawal of this support would be prejudicial to security as it would be likely to seriously undermine the judicial process and the rule of law, with adverse consequences for refugee return and reconciliation.

Police

23. The United Nations civilian police, with a presence of 1, 485 officers, has continued its dual role of maintaining law and order, and training the East Timor Police Service. The reported crime rate remains low.

24. On 30 September, the strength of the East Timor Police Service was 1,068 officers, 126 of whom have been placed at command level positions. On 15 October, the former director of the Police College was

appointed Commissioner of the Service. Senior officers undertake periodic specialized and refresher courses for management and promotion; their performance is periodically reviewed, and where necessary additional training is given. The training of the Maritime Unit has begun, and training for crowd management teams is continuing. The Special Protection Unit, the Police College, the Airport Security and Seaport Security units of the Police Service are now commanded by East Timorese. A medium-term plan for the development of the Service is currently being finalized. Donor support for its development will be necessary, however, especially with construction of essential facilities, equipment, transport and communications.

25. UNTAET provided human rights materials and training for members of the East Timor Police Service. Pocket-sized cards on the rights of accused and suspects have been produced and distributed to the members of the Service and United Nations civilian police to serve as an easy reference source.

East Timor Defence Force

26. The headquarters of the East Timor Defence Force has been established in Dili and the new training centre in Metinaro is fully functional. To date, 594 of the 1,500 regular soldiers have graduated from basic training. Of these, 146 are undergoing advanced training, and 50 are training for the small maritime component. An additional 347 cadets have been recruited into the Defence Force and are also undergoing training. An institutional framework for the Defence Force is being systematically introduced. A code of military discipline has been developed, as well as other administrative procedures.

C. Creation of a stable security environment

Security

27. The amount of militia activity on the East Timor side of the Tactical Coordination Line (the informal boundary agreed to by UNTAET and the Indonesian armed forces, pending formal demarcation of the border) has continued to decline. During the reporting period, there have been only two contacts between the UNTAET military component and unidentified persons deemed to be hostile, and a third incident involving the shooting of an Indonesian soldier dressed in civilian clothes in the Cova Lima district. The numbers of sightings of militia or suspected persons along the Tactical Coordination Line have fallen markedly. However, establishing identities in illegal cross-border sightings has become more difficult, with an increase in the incidence of illegal cross-border trade and theft.

28. The frequency and size of illegal markets in the vicinity of the Tactical Coordination Line has grown and there are substantial security concerns, as various armed groups attempt to control and regulate those markets for their own ends. UNTAET and the Indonesian authorities recently commenced discussion on a comprehensive border regime between East Timor and Indonesia, an essential element for stabilizing the border, but this will require considerable time and resources before it is resolved.

29. Reports of misinformation and intimidation in the refugee camps continue to be received. As noted in my previous report (see S/2001/719, para. 58), it is assessed that a core of hard-line militia in West Timor will continue to pose a potential threat to East Timor after independence. The Indonesian armed forces (TNI) and the Indonesian Police (POLRI) have been undertaking operations to restrict the movement of militia, especially with regard to any type of paramilitary activity. TNI and POLRI have reported that they continue to conduct sweeps for weapons in the refugee camps in West Timor.

30. The UNTAET military component and TNI have signed a new agreement to improve security cooperation. The Military Technical Arrangement was signed at Denpasar on 28 August at the Inter-Command Meeting between TNI Regional Commander Major General William da Costa and the previous Force Commander, Lieutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit, who has since ended his tour of duty and been replaced by Lieutenant General Winai Phattiyakul. The Military Technical Arrangement replaces the memorandum of understanding of 11 April 2000, and will improve the practical understandings between the UNTAET military component and TNI on information-sharing and the coordination of military activity in the vicinity of the Tactical Coordination Line.

Serious crimes

31. On 1 August, President Megawati Soekarnoputri issued an amendment to the Presidential Decree of 23 April 2001 that had established an ad hoc human rights

tribunal to deal with gross violations of human rights in East Timor. While the new decree expanded the jurisdiction of the tribunal, it is still restrictive in that it allows the trials of only those cases that occurred in the months of April and September 1999, and only in the districts of Liquica, Dili and Cova Lima. This excludes several egregious crimes committed in 1999. It is hoped that the tribunal will soon commence its work, and that the Government of Indonesia will take the necessary steps to expand its jurisdiction to cover all human rights crimes committed in East Timor from January to October 1999.

32. It is also hoped that the Indonesian Supreme Court will soon undertake a satisfactory review of the extremely light verdicts, recently affirmed by a Jakarta high court, issued to six men in connection with the murder on 6 September 2000, in West Timor, of three staff members from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, renewed efforts are required to ensure the implementation of the memorandum of understanding on cooperation in legal, judicial and human rights matters, concluded between Indonesia and UNTAET on 6 April 2000.

33. The Office of the East Timor General Prosecutor has to date filed 32 indictments, charging 62 individuals with crimes against humanity committed between 1 January and 25 October 1999. They include indictments for the crimes of murder and deportation in Same (Manufahi district) and for murder, deportation and extermination in the Oecussi enclave. The prosecution for the crime of extermination sets a precedent. Thirteen cases have been tried before the Special Panel of Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court. To date, 11 convictions have been handed down, one of which has been appealed, with sentences ranging from 7 to 15 years' imprisonment. The first trial for crimes against humanity in the Los Palos case (Lautem district) is reaching its closing stages.

34. The lack of experienced investigators, prosecutors and a sufficient number of experienced judges has inhibited the issuance of indictments and prosecutions and has been the subject of some criticism from Member States and international advocacy groups. The Office of the Deputy Special Representative has taken a direct role in addressing the problems, and the future organization, of the Serious Crimes Unit. If fully provided with resources, the Serious Crimes Unit should be able to complete the investigations and indictments for 10 priority cases of crimes against humanity by mid-2002.

Refugees

35. Since my last report to the Security Council (S/2001/719), UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and UNTAET, in close coordination with the Indonesian Refugee Task Force (in West Timor), have assisted in the repatriation of more than 2,600 refugees. As anticipated, after the elections both organized and spontaneous refugee returns began to increase. The total number of refugee returns for September 2001 was 1,800, compared to 603 returnees in August. During September, 994 returnees from Ainaro district and 257 for Cova Lima and Ainaro districts returned via Salele in Cova Lima district, in operations organized by UNTAET. Both of these operations were assisted significantly by the presence and support of Xanana Gusmão.

36. Since October 1999, 185,519 refugees have returned to East Timor, and an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 remain in Indonesia. The Government of Indonesia has announced that, after December 2001, it will no longer provide humanitarian assistance for the refugees.

37. The priority is now to ensure that the refugees are free to return voluntarily to East Timor, voluntary local resettlement in Indonesia being a secondary option. In this regard, reports of intimidation of refugees by militia elements remain a matter of concern.

38. The report of the United Nations inter-agency security assessment mission to West Timor recommended the establishment of a memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the Government of Indonesia, delineating security responsibilities and requirements, which must be in place before the United Nations agencies, including UNHCR, return to West Timor. The negotiations between the Government of Indonesia and the United Nations are ongoing.

Reconciliation

39. UNTAET continues to prepare the populations in the districts for returnees, to facilitate their peaceful reintegration and longer-term reconciliation. While there remains some concern for reprisals against some returnees in the future, incidences of violence have been minimal.

40. While perpetrators of serious crimes must be dealt with by the courts, those implicated in lesser crimes will be dealt with by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. The Commission is also empowered to hold hearings and seek evidence in order to establish the truth about all relevant events which occurred in East Timor from 25 April 1974 to 25 October 1999. It will have a mandate of two years and will report, and make recommendations based on its findings, to the Government. Work towards the establishment of the Commission is well under way. The Commission will be predominantly staffed by East Timorese, assisted by an international technical assistance unit, and will be funded from voluntary contributions, which have not yet reached the target amount.

III. Economic and social development

41. Significant progress in the fields of economic and social development in East Timor has been made during the transitional period. The administrative structures provided by UNTAET have assisted a range of humanitarian and development partners, both Member States and international organizations, to implement wide-ranging recovery and development cooperation activities throughout the territory. The continued careful targeting of the limited, uncommitted, voluntary funds will be critical to the recovery of the territory's economic and social sectors and poverty reduction.

A. Economy

42. Precise data on the overall recovery of the economy and its sectoral composition will not be available until completion of national accounts and household survey exercises early in 2002. Preliminary macroeconomic assessments indicate continued low inflation and continued growth in line with the estimates of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, albeit from the current impoverished economic base.

43. The recovery of the gross domestic product (GDP) is fuelled by an expansion of government expenditure, high demand for services in Dili and continuing agricultural recovery. Rural recovery has been slower than urban, and is constrained by poor transport networks and loss of rural market and credit systems. This argues for continued disproportionate public investment in rural areas, to balance private investment flowing into the capital. While there is widespread expectation of a substantial, positive, economic impact from the natural resources in the Timor Sea, the lack of certainty over the extent of the impact continues to demand a cautious outlook and militates against over-reliance on this sector in economic planning.

44. The decrease in United Nations personnel and expenditure will inevitably have an adverse impact on growth, and special efforts, including poverty reduction initiatives and structural reforms, may be required to counteract a sudden reduction in the demand for labour and consumption expenditure linked to the UNTAET presence. In August 2001, the Transitional Government established a working group comprising Government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the international financial institutions, to assess the scale, timing, and social and economic impact of the international draw-down in East Timor; the working group expects to finalize its report in November 2001, including policy options to mitigate the impact.

45. In addition to the temporary distortions linked to the international presence, a number of structural constraints likely to inhibit sustained future growth will also have to be addressed. Principal among these are legislation on property rights and on land claims, as well as a sound commercial and regulatory framework. Progress in these technical areas will require targeted international expertise to provide Timorese policy makers with appropriate options.

B. Development planning

46. The newly created Commission on Planning within the East Timor Public Administration will prepare a plan for medium-term expenditures to help ensure fiscal sustainability, with an emphasis on reducing poverty. Participation by the East Timorese people will be ensured through a Consultative Commission of Civil Society on Development. In addition to national consultation, sector status reports will be prepared by each government department. These initiatives will form the basis for the national development plan. In the interim, progress during the transitional period continues to be monitored through key benchmarks which were presented to the Security

Council in my most recent progress report (S/2001/719). A report on the progress made against the quarter ending on 30 September 2001 is now being compiled within the East Timor Public Administration.

C. Agriculture

47. East Timor remains highly reliant on subsistence agriculture for the livelihood of the majority of the population. A significant focus of the Division of Agricultural Affairs has continued to be increasing crop production. Feasibility and engineering studies have been completed for 14 irrigation systems in various states of disrepair and East Timorese civil servants are taking comprehensive training courses provided by donors. Farmers continue to rely on the Administration for fertilizer in time for the wet season planting in November. Efforts are being made to institute organic certification for agricultural production, particularly for coffee. A strategic plan for the development of the fisheries sector is being put in place and additional contributions from donors are being sought for material and technical support to implement the plan.

D. Infrastructure

48. A number of infrastructure sectors are well advanced in their planning for sustainable operations beyond independence, but others are having significant trouble either matching their programmes to available funding or identifying additional funding sources from already heavily committed donor budgets. Income currently being collected by some revenue-earning divisions is encouraging, but there is still uncertainty about the longer-term revenue collection capacity.

49. In the transport sector, while essential roads have been maintained and quickly reopened after closures, rains and heavy usage (including by United Nations military assets) have resulted in the continued overall deterioration of the road network. Donors currently fund a level of road repair and maintenance that could not be sustained through the government budget in the medium term. Likewise, to maintain international civil aviation standards, a substantial amount of highly specialized technical support will be required.

50. To develop a longer-term solution to the important issue of telecommunications for East Timor, the Transitional Government is proceeding with a competitive tender for a Build, Operate and Transfer project to re-establish and run telecommunications in East Timor. On the critical issue of the power sector, there are continuing challenges, owing to the difficulty of maintaining power generation systems either neglected for a considerable time or damaged and destroyed in September 1999.

E. Education

51. Much progress has been achieved in the education sector. The severity of the damage to educational facilities, however, means that the support of international development programmes will need to continue well past independence, to restore infrastructure and accommodate a fast-growing population and expanding enrolment rates.

52. Substantial levels of external assistance were crucial to supporting the first regular school year under the transitional administration, and will continue to play a vital role in the new school year that has just begun. To meet a projected increase in school enrolment, 1,000 additional teachers are being recruited. All the textbooks and school furniture to be provided under the Emergency School Readiness Project have been delivered and are now being distributed to schools, while about 2,370 classrooms (or 86 per cent) have been rehabilitated under the project. In addition, a comprehensive school mapping survey has been completed and five prototype schools are now under construction.

F. Health

53. In the health sector, progress continues to be seen under the sector-wide approach to restoring access to basic services and establishing the policies, systems and human resources needed for a sustainable health system. There has been a continuing shift towards East Timorese management. A total of 719 East Timorese health staff have taken up positions at national and district levels and 630 more are being prepared. A plan has been developed to ensure full transfer of the management of district health services from international non-governmental organizations to the East Timorese District Health Management Teams. A minimal staff of foreign specialists has been recruited for the Dili National Hospital, following its transfer

from the International Committee of the Red Cross to government management.

54. Two of four rounds of training of midwife trainers in clean and safe child delivery have been completed. Workshops on midwifery standards and nutrition have been held for district supervisors. The first training courses in integrated management of childhood illness have been held and guidelines on syndromic management of sexually transmitted diseases have been prepared. Contracts have now been awarded for the reconstruction of 22 community health centres, and the construction of the new central medical warehouse is well advanced. An assessment of hospital capacity and needs has been completed as a first step towards defining the needs for hospital reconstruction and rehabilitation.

IV. Successor mission

A. Transition to the successor mission

55. In the months prior to the independence of East Timor, UNTAET will be working to adjust its size and configuration to respond to the needs at hand, and to position itself to ensure a smooth and seamless transition to a post-independence role for the United Nations.

56. Subject to the continuation of the prevailing stable security conditions in East Timor, the reductions of the UNTAET military component referred to in my last report will commence in November. The authorized strength of the military component of UNTAET is 8,950 troops, and the current deployment is 7,947. The plan provides for a reduced force of some 5,000 troops by independence. Commensurate reductions would be made in the military engineering, medical, aviation and support units. This would be achieved through scheduled troop rotations. Likewise, it is envisaged that the civilian police component, which has a current authorized strength of 1,640, would be reduced to 1,250 by independence.

57. At the same time, the reductions in the staff of the East Timor Public Administration (formerly East Timor Transitional Administration) funded by assessed contributions presented in July are being implemented. At the end of July, the Administration had 552 international staff and 606 United Nations Volunteers. By late September 2001, UNTAET had already achieved the October target of reducing this civilian presence by 35 per cent; plans for a total reduction of 75 per cent are expected to be achieved by the end of the transition period. This reduction will be implemented in a phased manner to minimize the negative effect on the delivery of basic government services and on the local economy, as well as to ensure that the job of establishing a sustainable administration is advanced.

58. Without prejudice to the discussions in the Constituent Assembly, it is possible that the Constitution will recommend the holding of presidential elections prior to independence. In such an eventuality, additional resources would need to be sought, so that UNTAET could ensure that the election is conducted successfully.

B. Plan for the successor mission

59. In its resolution 1338 (2001), the Security Council requested detailed recommendations for a substantial international presence in East Timor after independence, developed in consultation with the East Timorese people and in coordination with the other relevant international and bilateral actors, in particular the international financial institutions and the United Nations funds and programmes. As previously reported (see S/2001/719, paras. 53 and 54), planning for this presence was undertaken in the field, with the support of an integrated mission task force in New York, and drawing upon consultations with major stakeholders.

60. The plan provides for an integrated peacekeeping mission headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which would be composed of a military component, a civilian police component, and a small civilian component, including experts who would provide crucial assistance to the emergent East Timorese administration. The latter component will be essential to the functioning of the government in the immediate post-independence period.

61. The primary focus of the successor mission will be to ensure the security of East Timor and the viability and stability of its government structures, allowing for the completion of the mandate entrusted by the Security Council to UNTAET. The mission will be based on the premise that operational responsibilities must be fully devolved to the East Timorese authorities as soon as this is feasible. A continuing process of

assessment and downsizing is therefore envisaged over a period of two years, starting from independence.

Military component

62. As noted above, at the time of independence, the military component will consist of some 5,000 military personnel, including 120 military observers. The western sector would continue to have a two-battalion group with a sector headquarters. The Oecussi enclave would retain a battalion group, and the central and eastern sectors would be reduced to only one mobile battalion. Further staged reductions will take place during the life of the successor mission, subject to ongoing security assessments and progress achieved in the development of the East Timor Defence Force.

63. The reconfigured structure provides for a highly mobile force to counter possible external threats, while retaining some flexibility to ensure internal security. The task of the military component of the successor mission will be to assist in the maintenance of a secure environment in East Timor in cooperation with the East Timor Defence Force, the United Nations civilian police and the East Timor Police Service.

64. In the border area, the force would continue to take measures to deter unlawful armed groups and ensure security, pending the full development of the East Timor Defence Force. The force would also provide security for United Nations personnel and property. The mission's military observers will play a key role in maintaining liaison with both Indonesian and East Timor defence forces.

65. As regards the development of the East Timor Defence Force, it is envisaged that a battalion would be ready, following completion of its initial training, for operational tasks in the eastern sector in June 2002. A second battalion would be ready by late 2003. However, the schedule for the development of the Defence Force could be shortened, subject to the provision of donor funds for the necessary capital investments. It is foreseen that East Timor would take over full responsibility for its own defence arrangements by mid-2004 at the latest.

Civilian police component

66. The United Nations will continue its police work to ensure that the East Timor Police Service is developed as a service and an institution that is credible, accountable and professional. Drawing on the lessons learned from other operations, the main objective of the successor mission's police component will be to promote the capacity and integrity of the Service and its personnel.

67. The civilian police component will be led by an international police commissioner, and will continue to perform a dual role of executive policing while supporting the development of the East Timor Police Service. At the present rate of training, UNTAET expects that 1,500 East Timor police officers will be operationally deployed by 31 January 2002.

68. While it had been envisaged that the East Timor Police Service would ultimately comprise a force of 3,000 officers, it is possible that this figure may be reduced, depending upon ongoing consultations with and the decisions to be taken by the new Government of East Timor. If this happens, it will permit corresponding reductions within the United Nations civilian police component. Furthermore, it is expected that reductions in the civilian police component will occur throughout the life of the successor mission as the East Timor Police Service acquires the capacity to assume full executive responsibilities.

69. The expertise needed of civilian police officers will shift from basic patrolling and tactics to mentoring, management and administration skills. Staffing with appropriately qualified international civilian police officers, as well as civilian administrative experts, will be critical to the attainment of the goals of the mission. The East Timor Police Service has only a rudimentary infrastructure, no logistical or administrative framework, and it continues to be almost completely reliant on UNTAET resources for transport, communication and administration. As the UNTAET presence draws down, it will be essential to the viability of the East Timor Police Service that additional resources that cannot be transferred from UNTAET be secured through bilateral and multilateral donors.

70. The ultimate objective of the civilian police component will be to certify all East Timorese police personnel and to endorse all police institutional structures at the field and national headquarters level.

71. Since the strategy and implementation plan of the new mission will depend very largely on the successful preparation of the East Timor Defence Force and Police Service to take over the responsibility for the external and internal security, respectively of East

Timor, it is absolutely essential that these two organizations be properly funded and that their operations be sustainable under the budget of the new administration. I appeal to Member States to support an adequate and sustainable capital programme to equip both organizations.

72. The presence in an independent East Timor of a United Nations civilian police with executive law enforcement functions is an unprecedented arrangement that will require careful consideration of command and control arrangements. It is clear that this responsibility must continue to rest with my Special Representative. The head of the East Timorese police would focus on the development of the national police force, would have administrative responsibility for its members, but would only assume operational command upon transfer of the executive authority by the United Nations. The details of the proposed arrangements will be finalized in consultation with the Government of East Timor, and will be included in my next report to the Security Council.

Civilian component

73. As in all peacekeeping missions, the civilian component would include the required substantive staff to support my Special Representative. It would also include a human rights presence, both in Dili and the districts, as well as a Serious Crimes Unit, and a reduced liaison presence in Indonesia. I believe that the functions of the Serious Crimes Unit are expected to continue to be funded from assessed contributions to assist with the vital tasks of bringing to justice those responsible for serious crimes in 1999. This responds to the priorities established by the Security Council in resolution 1319 (2000); it is also consistent with the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which stressed that sufficient resources should be authorized by the Security Council "where justice, reconciliation and the fight against impunity require it" (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 39). Progress in this area, with its intrinsic link to the process of reconciliation, should not be disrupted. While most of the investigations will be completed by mid-2002, the related trials will take a further year.

74. In addition, external civilian assistance will be required to support the continued functioning of the new administration. Voluntary or bilateral arrangements are being sought to meet this requirement to the extent feasible. Consultations have also been conducted with the United Nations agencies to ascertain what kind of assistance they will be in a position to provide at this time. However, experience has shown that such resources may arrive late, or not at all, as donor priorities change and new demands arise. Voluntary contributions are already stretched thin in East Timor, with even the two primary trust funds not yet fully resourced, and United Nations agencies are experiencing substantial constraints.

75. In my previous report I explained that civilian Professional staff would need to remain within a successor mission to provide key assistance to the new Timorese Government, both in the area of training and to ensure the continued daily functioning of the administration. Extensive effort has gone into the planning process, which is still under way. This includes in-depth consultations with the East Timorese, since the successful implementation of the plan requires a clear understanding on the part of the stakeholders of the level and type of assistance that is to be provided. Further analysis of the needs on the ground is also continuing, including a skills audit by UNDP, which will be completed in the coming weeks.

76. While some refinement to current planning may still be required, the United Nations has identified approximately 100 core functions for which local expertise does not exist, but which are essential to the stability and functioning of government; those core functions therefore require assured funding for a short period after independence to permit the completion of the Security Council mandate and to ensure that the investments made to date are not jeopardized. Two thirds of these positions are intended as mentoring functions (advisory and training), and one third would be direct, line functions. They would primarily cover public finance and banking, justice and infrastructure, as well as central and common services necessary to maintaining government functioning.

77. Nearly half of those positions would be in the financial sector, the majority of the staff concerned working within the Ministry of Finance, in the areas of management, administration, revenue, tax policy, customs, treasury services, budgeting and auditing. The East Timorese capacity in the finance sector is rudimentary, and a stable financial management system will be critical to the survival of the future Government, and to ensure that donor funds are efficiently utilized. A number of experts would work out of the Central Payments Office, covering the areas

of management and supervision, accounting, economics, vault custody, settlements, network administration and general administration.

78. As indicated earlier in this report, the administration of justice in East Timor lacks experienced jurists and court infrastructure, and must be further consolidated. In the justice sector, the successor mission would include court of appeal judges, special panel judges, court administrators and public defenders, as well as prison staff advisers and trainers.

79. Other core civilian functions within the successor mission would focus upon strengthening internal administration (in such areas as human resource management, archival conservation, and district administration) and the infrastructure sector (civil aviation and sea transportation, and land and property issues). Experts would also provide capacity-building in management, procurement, supplies and inventory in the critical area of central administrative services, where failure could potentially cripple other parts of the Government. They would also assist in the drafting of legislative documents, and in ensuring compliance with international human rights instruments. Finally, expert advisers would be required to assist the new State in establishing demographic information, conducting foreign affairs, formulating economic policy, undertaking donor coordination, and supporting decision-making by constitutional organs.

80. Owing to the unprecedented scope of the UNTAET mandate, and the need to build the administration from the ground up, further external assistance beyond these core functions will unquestionably be required to ensure broader government services. With the support of UNDP, the Transitional Administration has prepared an overall framework for governance and public sector management, identifying priority areas in the short, medium and long term which would require funding from voluntary contributions. Following discussions with Cabinet members and heads of division of the East Timor Transitional Administration, approximately 135 functions, beyond those discussed above, were identified as being crucial to the effectiveness of the new State. I appeal to donors to contribute generously in order to meet these needs.

V. Financial matters

81. As indicated in my previous report (S/2001/719, para. 61), the General Assembly, in its resolution 55/228 B of 14 June 2001, authorized me to enter into commitments in an amount not exceeding $282 million gross for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2001 to meet the requirements of UNTAET for that period. The proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 is currently in preparation and will be considered by the General Assembly at the main part of its fifty-sixth session. Financial implications for the successor mission to UNTAET will be provided at a later stage when my recommendations for its establishment are finalized.

82. As at 30 September 2001, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNTAET for the period since its inception on 1 December 1999 amounted to $395.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $3,281.6 million.

VI. Observations and recommendations

83. In considering the requirements of the successor mission to UNTAET, it bears repeating that UNTAET began its mandate two years ago in the aftermath of a thorough destruction of East Timor's infrastructure and all institutions of government. The human resource base available in East Timor was limited by a history of scant opportunity and training and further depleted by the flight of many civil servants. Against this background, the mandate given by the Security Council in resolution 1272 (1999) to establish a national civil administration, assist in the development of civil and social services and support capacity-building for self-government was unprecedented in scope.

84. In a recent report to the Security Council entitled "No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations" (S/2001/394), while noting the importance of bringing to fruition the achievements of a peacekeeping operation, I made the following specific reflection regarding East Timor:

> "The essential requirement in the case of East Timor is to ensure that the enormous sacrifices of the East Timorese, the substantial investments of the international community, and the cooperation

of the parties required to bring about a successful transition to independence are not squandered for lack of international attention and support for the new State. At the same time, it is important to move towards a normal development assistance framework as quickly as is responsibly possible" (ibid., para. 43).

In a note (S/2001/905) prepared in response to my report, the President of the Security Council agreed that a major criterion for the Council's decision on the scaling down or withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation is the successful completion of its mandate. The members of the Council undertook to give consideration to the related questions or concerns identified in my report.

85. It is in this context that I submit to the Security Council for its consideration and approval the proposals contained in Section IV above. Mindful of the desirability of relying upon a "normal development assistance framework" wherever feasible, the plan for the successor mission contains core tasks that are crucial to protecting the progress made to date. It will be essential, however, that this contribution be supplemented by multilateral and bilateral arrangements.

86. As indicated above (see paras. 61 and 76), these core tasks will be performed by international staff for a period of two years or less after independence, as responsibilities are transferred progressively to the East Timorese within that period. In this connection, it is my intention, in the near future, to write to the President of the Security Council recommending a date for East Timor's independence, following consultations with my Special Representative and the Constituent Assembly, which is currently seized of this matter. The successor mission would be established on that date, and the mandate of UNTAET would therefore need to be extended accordingly.

87. Initially, the responsibility to establish a viable state in East Timor clearly belongs to its people. The East Timorese have amply demonstrated the depth of their commitment to this task through sacrifice, imagination and determination. I urge the Security Council to ensure that these foundations are not undermined and to consolidate the remarkable contribution it has already made to this historic undertaking.

(REVISED VERSION - 16 10 2001)

UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EAST TIMOR
EAST TIMOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SECOND TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF EAST TIMOR AND EAST TIMOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION



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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

For the period from 25 July to 15 October 2001

Corrigendum

1. **Paragraph 73**

   The third sentence *should read*

   The functions of the Serious Crimes Unit are expected to continue to be funded from assessed contributions to assist with the vital tasks of bringing to justice those responsible for serious crimes in 1999.

2. **Paragraph 87**

   The first sentence *should read*

   Ultimately, the responsibility to establish a viable state in East Timor clearly belongs to its people.

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Letter dated 18 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

As Chairman of the Group of Islamic States at the United Nations, I have the honour to request the Security Council, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to invite Mr. Mokhtar Lamani, Permanent Observer for the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations, to participate in the debate in the Council on the situation in Somalia, which is to be held on Friday, 19 October 2001.

(*Signed*) Moctar **Ouane**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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